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The Office of Housing undertook this case study of
 
the Korean Housing Guaranty Program in order to delineate 
the lessons to be learned from the experience and, in
 
this way, provide guidance for the formulation of multi­
year housing guaranty programs in other nations. 
The Korean Housing Guaranty Program, in which $105 
million of loans have been authorized since 1973, is one 
of the largest and rost significant in the Office of 
Housing. Thus far, 19,000 units have been built, which 
increasingly have been geared for purchase by lower­
income families. In addition to guaranteeing loans for 
projects, the Office of Houzing has assisted in the 
development of housing institutions in Kcrea and a funda­
mentally-changed national housing policy, and conducted 
a study of housing finance. New concepts of preserving
and upgrading existing housing stock have been introduced
 
in Korea. This has been achieved through sustained 
dialogue and negotiation between AID and the Korean govern­
ment, ard, in making this study, emphasis has been placed 
on the process of interaction between the two rather than 
on analyzing program results agai..s fixed criteria. 
We are most appreciative of the work o Planning

and Development Collaborative, International, which per­
formed the study in April, 1977. Alfred P. Van Huyck was
 
the team leader, Jeffrey R. S±ubbs was the urban economist, 
and Manorak Luangkhot w eesear he. . 
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INTRODUCTION
 
The preparation of a case study on the Korean Housing
 
Guaranty Program experience has proven to be a difficult under­
taking. The work was complex because the program has spanned
 
seven years and included five individual HIG loans as well as
 
multiple technical-assistance missions. In the chapters which
 
follow, these individual events will be discussed along with
 
the conclusions we reached
 
The Korean program experience is a story of considerable
 
success on the part of AID and the Korean National Housing
 
Corporation (KNHC). Construction was achieved of 19,000
 
housing units, which were made available to progressively lower­
income households. It is also a story of how sustained support
 
from AID and constant dialogue have brought about fundamental
 
changes in Korean housing policy qnd have introduced entirely
 
new concepts of preserving existing housing stock through
 
upgrading. In short, there are many accomplishments about
 
which both AID and the Koreans can be justly proud.
 
At a different level, the Korean program experience is an
 
interesting study of the relationship between an international
 
assistance agency and a developing country government. Each
 
had its own objectives and constraints while interacting over
 
a protracted period. This interaction demonstrates how a
 
common interest (in this case, support of the housing sector)
 
can be achieved only through an elaborate set of negotiations
 
based on mutual respect and understanding. it has not been
 
easy to achieve this common interest. It has required hard
 
bargaining on both sides, based on underlying assumptions
 
which are discussed in the following paragraphs.
 
A. THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
 
International support of housing in the developing
 
countries starts with a recognition of three,basic assump­
tions:
 
1. 	The developing countries have the obligation
 
to determine their policies, plans and strate­
gies for dealing with their own housing issues.
 
2. 	The scale of housing problems found within the
 
developing countries is of such magnitude, in
 
regard to the populations to be served, the
 
human and capital resources to be mobilized
 
and the existing constraints to be overcome,
 
that internationally-sponsored assistance can
 
only be considered a supplementary contribution
 
to codify and exchange world experience, to
 
augment to a minor extent the human and capital
 
resources available, and to act as a catalyst
 
for sustained action on the part of the devel­
oping countries in their own behalf.
 
3. 	Given the limited contribution feasible through
 
international cooperation, it is legitimate

and appropriate for international agencies to
 
determine for themselves the priorities and
 
conditions of their participation within
 
articulated requirements outlined by the devel-'
 
oping countries.
 
These implied assumptions have been the basis for the,
 
ongoing dialogue ant negotiation which have taken place
 
during the Korean program. This has been the framework in"
 
which AID and the Korean Government have sought to establish
 
common objectives for the program.
 
B. AID'S BASIC OBJECTIVES
 
The basic objectives of the Office of Housing within the
 
assumptions-outlined above have been the following:
 
To assist in building Korean institu­
'tional capacity, within both the public
 
and private sectors, to deal effectively

with the fundamental issues of shelter
 
and the poor majority.
 
2. 	To assist in mobilizing Korean human and
 
financial capacity to support the ­
improvement of housing andthe stAndard'
 
of living for the poor majority'bf Korean'
 
people.
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3. 
To provide professional, specialist support to
assist in preparing a Korean National Housing
Policy and to ensure its implementation.
 
4. 
To provide selective capital assistance for
program and project implementation.
 
It must be realized that the capital needs of developing
countries, including Korea's, are so vast that interiational
capital assistance can, at whatever level, have very little
overall impact in strictly monetary value. 
It is appropriate,
therefore, to utilize capital assistance to achieve develop­ment purposes. 
Three such areas were given priority in
utilizing HIG capital assistance in Korea.
 
1. 
Finance the introduction of new, innovative techno­logies or a~proaches9. 
 An element or political risk is
,involved in doing something differently, whether it be new
approaches to housing construction, infrastructure or any
other aspect of habitat. 
The Housing Guaranty Program,
through capital assistance support, can absorb part of that
risk and encourage developing countries to attempt innova­tive approaches by providing necessary capital.
 
In Korea, AID utilized its HIG Program to introduce a
number of innovations in apartment and '1ndominiumdesign
and to support the introduction of these solutions in pro­vincial cities where they had not been attempted before. 
 It
was, also, possible through HIG loans to introduce a Home
Improvement Program in Seoul. 
In 1977, a Home Ymprovement
Program will be introduced in provincial cities as well.
These are examples of HIG money being used to induce risk­taking by Korean institutions, in order to attempt new inno­vations in solving shelter problems.
 
2. 
Provide caital to Korean housing instiutionsto
accelerateteirrate 
 oth Ti growth ca-n
tained through mobilization of-local resources. be sus-
AID's work
with the Korean National Housing Corporation has demonstrated
this objective. 
At the time of preparing the first HIG loan
in 1972, KNHC was building 2,300 units per year. 
Evan though
KNHC was building 26,000 units per year in 1576, the percen­tage of total funds represented by the HIG loan had fallen
from 29 percent of KNUC resources in 1973 to 19 percent in 1976.
 
On the other hand, AID was unable to interest the Korean
Housing Bank in participating in the HIG Program and the non­involvement of this important institution has hindered the
achievement of AID's overall objectives in Korea, as will be
discussed later in this report.
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3. 	Provide capital assistance to augment technical
 
This assistance can pro­assistance in building capacity. 

vide opportunities to undertake new program directions. The
 
Home Improvement Program in Seoul required a combination of
 
technical assistance and capital assistance in order to be,
 
successful. Without technical assistance, it would have been
 
unlikely that Korean professionals on the Seoul City staff
 
could have implemented the Home Improvement Program because
 
it represented such a major departure from their experience.
 
On the other hand, if it were not for the HIG loan availabil­
ity, it is unlikely that Seoul City would have accepted the
 
In this case, the HIG loan represented
technical assistance. 

"leverage" which allowed a much-needed innovation to be
 
demonstrated in Korea.
 
It is fair to say that the Office of Housing has only
 
been partially successful in achieving its overall develop­
ment objectives in the Korea HIG Program, even though it has
 
achieved the individual project objectives of each loan. This
 
is not to say that AID's accomplishments have not been signif­
icant and numerous. This report will examine both the achieve­
ments and the shortfalls. One reason for less-than-total
 
success is that AID's present objectives were not clearly set,
 
prior to the start of the program in 1972, and have, in fact,
 
been emerging in recent years to reflect the Office of Housing's
 
own 	Shelter Sector Policy (1974) and the Congressional man,ate
 
cbncerning the "poor majority." Therefore, whfile the most
 
recent projects are in conformity with overall objectives,
 
some of the earlier ones do not meet current criteria. Also,
 
AID's objectives and the Korean objectives have never fully
 
coincided and have given rise to constant negotiation.
 
C. KOREAN GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES
 
In 1971/72, when the AID-sponsored HIG Program was just
 
getting under way, the Korean Government had just passed the
 
1972 Housing Construction Promotion Law. This law, which is
 
discussed in more detail later, was a significant milestone
 
in that it gave the first strong recognition to the impor­
tance of housing in Korea and formally endorsed the concept
 
of foreign borrowing for housing construction. Although
 
clearly a step forward, the law rested on certain premises
 
which were contrary to AID's own emerging objectives. Among
 
the 	most significant of these were the following:
 
1. 	The Korean Government was clearly commited to
 
raising the standards'of the physical quality of
 
housing, particularly in terms of the size of
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Units sponsored and the use of high-quality

construction materials and techniques. Obvi­
busly, such housing could not be made avail­
able to low-income people except at i.normous
 
subsidy.
 
2. 	No specific recognition was given to the par-,

ticular needs of low-income people and, in fact,

the program was clearly oriented to middle-income
 
and even upper-income people.
 
3. 	The city planning Jaws at that time permited

only the highest standards of infrastructure
 
development, large lot sizes, and rigorous
 
building codes, etc. The implicit policy was
 
specifically aimed at clearing all of the
 
"illegal" housing in the cities, particularly
 
in Seoul, which fell below the high standards
 
set 	in the laws.
 
4. 	Most decisions regarding housing were taken
 
without sufficient data or analysis to fully

document the implications of specific actions
 
or non-actions. There was no housing policy,

other than a general objective to build as
 
many units of high-quality housing stock as
 
allocated funds would permit.
 
The Korean Government's fundamental position, in improv­
ing the physical size and standards of housing and demolish­
ing all units which failed to meet its standards, was based
 
on the assumption that rapid economic growth would translate
 
into increased household incomes which, in turn, would allow
 
high-standard housing to be constructed. Furthermore, severe
 
weather conditions in Korea added to the conviction that only

high-standard housing should be built. These ideas, coupled

with a traditional sense of the need to sacrifice which has
 
contributed so much to the success of Korea's economic growth,

have permitted the Government to hold to its objectives in
 
housing, with sincerity and a feeling of confidence that they
 
are on the correct path.
 
Obviously, these objectives do not coincide with AID's
 
objectives as previously listed, even though both parties

recognized from the outset merit in both positions. The proj.­
ects which evolved in Korea with HIG support and ancillary
 
technical assistance have been the result of mutual efforts
 
to reach common ground on the underlying objectives to be
 
sought.
 
It is fair to say that the availability of substantial
 
capital from HIG sources has been the catalyst in achieving
 
movement in the Korean objectives toward those sought by AID.
 
The Korean Government has clearly needed and wanted the HIG
 
loans as a small, but important, part of their overall eco­
nomic development strategy. This, in turn, has permitted AID 
to seek changes in policy and innovative programs, with the 
anticipation that their demonstration would show the Korean 
Government the advantages of continuing in a similar Airection 
with its own resources. 
The impact of AID initiatives on the Korean Government
 
has been mixed. There has been an overall lowering of
 
housing standards and an introduction of smaller, average
 
unit sizes beyond those specifically financed by HIG loans.
 
There have been some significant policy changes, but these
 
have not yet achieved a full impact throughout the housing
 
sector in Korea. There has clearly been institutional improve­
ment in KNHC, to the point that it must be considered one of
 
the most effective house-building organizations in the world
 
(including the developed countries). The Home Improvement
 
Proqram, one of the most important innovations, has gained
 
some influencial supporters, but has not yet been accepted
 
to the point that the Government would cancel its approach
 
to demolition of "illegal" houses. On balance, there has
 
been substantial progress but the full realization of policy
 
objectives is still in the future and not yet certain.'
 
D. A FUNDAMENTAL POLICY ISSUE
 
The chapters which follow will document the various issues
 
alluded to above and will define more fully the successes and
 
shortcomings of the Korea HIG Program. It is well to pause

at the beginning to consider the fundamental issue of whether
 
or not a housing program should have been undertaken in Korea,
 
given the difference in policy objectives between AID and the
 
Korean Government. This issue is, of course, somewhat blurred
 
in that AID did not initially have the same set of policy

objectives as those it now has much more clearly stated.
 
In fact, had AID been working under its present policy
 
objectives in 1971, it is unlikey that any HIG Program would
 
have commenced, because the policy-objective gap would have
 
been to great to compromise. It is only because AID was able
 
to initiate its activities with the Banpo Apartment Project
 
(clearly an upper-middle-income project precluded under pres­
ent policy) that it was possible for rapport and confidence
 
to. develop that later led,,-insubsequent loahs"!'io'the series 
of-accomplishments which have been in line with overall AID­
policy objectives. ' 
This is not a simple question, nor one that is specifi­
cally related to housing. If we accept the view that the
 
Gvernment's initial objectives at a given time wera honestly

formulated in what it perceived as in the best interests of its
 
people, how can other possible objectives be considered and
 
introduced except through negotiation and compromise? AID
 
elected to follow this negotiation route and has a number of
 
significant accomplishments to its credit as a.result, even
 
though it has not been successful in totally convincing the
 
Koreans of the fundamental correctness of its approach.
 
An alternative, of course, would be to take a rigid stance
 
on the detailed policy objective sought and insist that the
 
host country accept those policies or forego the capital

assistance available. This approach has not proven very suc­
cessful when it has been utilized in the past, especially when
 
the issues qap has been great at the outset. It certainly
 
would have been a failure in Korea.
 
AID has had the opportunity to develQp mutually-supported

objectives with the Koreans through a series of successively

lower-standard projects. This has meant that AID's objectives

have been progressively achieved over time. Hopefully, a
 
basis has been formed for a lasting impact on the housing
 
sector in Korea. This seems to be the correct way to proceed
 
with a host country government. It remains to be seen, however,
 
if this approach can be followed in the future, given the
 
specifics of the present AID mandate.
 
The success of the overall AID approach in Korea, of
 
utilizing this negotiated "stepping down" approach, while
 
very real does not suggest that it could not have been
 
handled better with more forward planning. The single, most
 
important conclusion of this case study is that it is essen­
tial to initiate a forward-planning process at the outset, when
 
it is likely that AID and a host country are going to enter into
 
a multiple-year lending program. 
The failure to prepare an
 
overall AID strategy for achieving policy objectives in Korea"
 
clearly has acted to limit the individual success of the
 
specific policy objective accomplishments. This theme is
 
taken up again in Part Three of this report (Lessons for
 
the Future of the HIG Program). 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
This report has been organized into an Introduction,

Chapter I, three parts and three appendices. First, the
 
framework is set in the Introduct.on and Chapter I: The Con­text of rIorean Housing Program. Part One traces the AID and

Korean dialogue on housing policy and related issues from 1971
 
to 1977. Part Two describes each of the HIG-financed proj­
ects, their individual objectives and related issues. Part
 
Three presents some consideration of possible lessons for
 
future HIG Programs, based on the conclusions of the Korean
 
Case Study. Appendix I describes the experience of other inter­
national agencies with housing in Korea. 
Appendix II summarizes
 
the statistical data regarding each HIG project. Appendix

III presents general statistical data about the housing sec­
tor in Korea.
 
This approach seemed the most efficient in order to focus
 
the material. However, it does run the risk of understating

the crucial interaction which has taken place between negoti­
ations for individual projects and the housing policy issues.
 
Wherever possible, the connection has been referenced in the
 
text, but the importance of using the specific loan negoti­
ation to foster policy change cannot be overstated.
 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTE 
1952 	 to 1977 
1. 	 Immigration of refugees followed by industriali- Io. completion of natlonrl Land Development Plan
zation. rapid-urban growth and increasing 197201931 

urban housing shortages, 
- 11. Enactment in December of thi National nousing 
Cnstruction Promotion 
19-
 INatonaPlic ounciudl.
th 	 cetd atoa 

2 	 Housing Policy Council. 
2. 	ranctfent of tile 1962 City Planning Law. 1973 
1963 	to 1966 
 12. 	AID's return mission during March to June and
 
completion of the first project feasibility 

3. 	 Eactment of the Comprehensive Devulopment study.
 
of Uational Territory Act which lad to devel-
 13. 	 Enactment on March Sth of the Housing improve­opment of the lational land Development Plan, 
 meat 	Promotion Enforcement Law which described
1972-19a1. 
 procedures for the designation of redevelopment 

areas4. 	Establishment of tie Korean National lousing and enabled the transfer of land to local
governments.

Corporation within the MinisLry of Construc-

tion. BNIIC superseded the Korean 'Nationl 

Blousing Aainistration. KNICs initial :ethe- 14. 
 inactment of Enforcement Decree of Dousing Con­rized 	capsta: was W4 500 million and its paid-
 struction Piomotion Law which 
et 	conditions
in capital was W 477 million. 
 for issuance and purchase of Hational ilousing
Bonds and set limits on the types of housing
to be 	 financed out of tile National Uousing196Fnd 1915 Signing of Implementation A2reement 00s 1490 
Eii-pong 5 apartments. (Loan aemunt U.S. 105.-p g apartments. (Loan amoun
wSic. established the KoreanHousingank. 	 KorS.n 10nkn,million).

whh 
 e e tzation 

t1974 

1969to 1970 

6. 	 Initiation Of Seoul lanusing-and Squatter 16. PAI)C report is January on ROKG progress in theclear- field of housing, via-avis recommendLations in theasace 	 irogramst 
­ " Pre-lnvestment Survey and recommendations for the 
Large-scale clearance of content and organization of a national housingslum areas; 	 policy.

Construction of a to 10 pyong "citizen's 

apartments with interiors to be completed by 
 17. iestructuring of the Housing Policy Comittee 

the occupant: 
 in farcl and creation of the Housing PolicyPosettlemeate projects outside the Seoul green
belt 	in areas sc as Sunq Ham. Tdsk force. 
18. Signing in I.pril of Implementation Agreement 
1971 
~amount 0021 3700 1i-and-lS-pyong apartments. (iloAnU.S. 	 20 million). 
19. 	 Issuance in". 	 Submissios in OcLctubr August of worldwide AID Shelterof AID's Pre-Investment Sector licy,
lousin., Sun:vev ly4BlS;. and rCH consultants, 

8. 	 Loopletiog: of tun-year Plan for Construction 
of 2.500.000 louses. 
9. 	 Enactment of amendments to City Planning Law 
permittang price freezes on land intended forpubl ic purposeu. 
20. 	Signing in April of Impleinentation Agrement
 
03 1565 13-and-IS-pyong apartments. (Loan
 
amount U.S. 25 million). Evaluation survey 
of the 1974 Housing Guaranty Program. 
2. Issuac I ay c te National ouing Policyand 	long-Term Construction Planwhich superseded
 
1971 	Ten-Year Housing Construction Plan. 
22. 	Assignment in August of a permanent AID regional
 
housing bureau representative to post in
 
Seoul.
 
1976
 
23. 	 Assignment in March of an AID regional housing
 
bureau adviser to post in Seoul.
 
24. 	 Signing in July of Implementation Agreement 
004t Squatter upgrading in Seoul. (loani s 
amount U.S. 10 million). 
25. 	Signing in July of ImplesentaiLon Agreement

005a 4700 7.5-10-and 13 prong apartments.

(Loan amount U.S. 15 million). Evaluation 
survey of '.975 lousing Guaranty Program. 
26. 	 Completion in October of the Fourth 
lousing

Construction Plan which superseded Lisa Long-
Term Housing Construction Plan and tie 	 ay1975 national 
lousing Policy. Stressed mobili­
of financing and increased supply ofland for small building sites. Assmm a 
reduced investment per unit in private housing. 
1977
 
27. 	Submission of Pratt Report on Housing Finance. 
Recommended one-time subsidies in place of 
interest-rate subsidies and a simplified loan 
structure. 
28. 	 Expected nignihg of Implementation Agreement 
for squatter upgrading in secondary cities. 
(Loan amoant U.S. 10 million).
29. 	 Expected signing of Implementation Agreement
 
for 	additional KlUIC ibousing. Initiation of
third evaluation survey of-lcNIBC AID-financed 
apartments. 
30. 	 fxpected undertaking 01 housing preferences 
survey and housing construction induitry study. 

THE "CONTEXT OF KOREAN HOUSING PROGRAMS 
It is necessary to understand the overall context of the
 
Korean housing sector before the specific successes and short­
falls of AID's involvement can be assessed, because it is the
perception of the context which gave rise to the initial dif­ferences in objectives between AID and the Korean Government,
 
even though there was general agreement on the facts.
 
A. POPULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS
 
The total population of Korea is presently 34,900,000;

It has increased at a peak rate of 2.2 percent per annum.
 
Overall growth is now estimated at 1.7 percent per annum and
 
,is expected to decline to approximately 1.6 percent by 1981.
 
Current government policy is to encourage the growth of
 
lagging regions and smaller cities. The past rate of urban
 
population growth has been as high as 5.0 to 6.0 percent per

annum. 
The expected rate of urban population growth through

1981 is of the order of 4.0 to 5.Q percent, with the larger

cities growing more slowly than in the recent past and with
 
the smaller cities growing more rapidly as a reflection of
 
current regional policy. 1/
 
The rural population is expected to remain relatively

constant. By 1981, the overall population of Korea may be of
 
the order of 60 percent urban with continuing industrialization,
 
I/ The source of population data and forecasts is the/,,

Korea Industrial Development Research Institute's Study bn 1: 
Housing Policy Formulation. KIDI, December 1974. For the
 
most recent update, see the Ministry of Construction's Fourth
Housing Construction Plan. Housing Section, Ministry of Con­
struction, October 1976.
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Figure 1. Street scene in one of the
 
secondary cities. National policy
 
encourages their growth.
 
Figure 2. Low-income housing in Seoul.
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Figure 3. Small three-story apart­
ments opposite Ahun #2 redevelopment
 
area in Seoul showing the high densi­
ties achieved by private builders.
 
Figure 4. Sung Nam, near Seoul. Surfaced streets and
 
better sanitation would be a great improvement.
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Figure 5. Luxury housing in Seoul.
 
Figure 6. 
Rural housing of mud block construction.
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-Figure 7. High-quality house built on small 20-pyong
 
lot; near main road in Sung Nam, near Seoul.
 
IVip 
Figure 8. Small owner-built house: Sung Nam, near
 
Seoul.
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implying continued urban growth for most of the remainder of
 
the century. The most recent forecast of income available is
 
the Fourth Five-Year Plan. (See Table 1) Based on an overall
 
GNP rate of growth of 9.0 percent per annum between 1977 and
 
1981, it is estimated that private consumption expenditure
 
will increase at an annual rate of 6.1 percent in real terms.
 
This reflects high priorities for savings and investment and
 
government expenditure at the expense of current private con­
sumption. Given an expected rate of population growth of 1.6
 
percent per annum, this implies a growth rate of per capita
 
consumption expenditure of 4.4 percent per annum.
 
This combinati6n of declining population growth rates and
 
strong economic growth rates supports, on the surface, the
 
conclusion of the Korean Government that the nation could
 
afford relatively high standards of construction and space
 
allocation. Indeed, AID also recognizes that Korean housing
 
requirements, given their remarkable economic development his­
tory, will not be the same as those in other much less fortu­
nate developing countries. Nonetheless, ?ID and a significant
 
number of Korean Government officials recognize that, in spite
 
of the economy's aggregate growth, there will be, for many
 
years to come, a significant need for housing specifically
 
oriented to lower-income groups. This recognition comes from
 
analyzinq the household income data and the existing housing

stock.
 
B. 	HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION
 
AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING
 
The primary source of income data available in Korea is
 
the Economic Planning Board (EPB), Bureau of Statistics' Quarterly 
"Family Income and Expenditure Survey." This survey presents
 
expenditure data for almost all types of households and income
 
data for wage and salary earners. The World Bank believes
 
that the EPB survey results are possibly high by about five
 
percent, based on the methodology and coverage employed. In
 
1976, the AID RHUDO office updated income statistics for the
 
urban areas of Korea. The results are presented in Table 2
 
which shows that the estimated mean income in the-urban areas
 
of Korea at the end of 1976 was W 92,100 per month (a median of
 
W 77,500 per month). Approximately 20 percent of all house­
holds had incomes below W 47,600 per month while 20 percent
 
had monthly incomes above W 121,800.
 
The amount of housing,that can be afforded by each income
 
group is an important issue of housing policy. Based upon 1972
 
. EPB survey data presented in Table 3, it appears that the
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TABLE 1 
Fourth Plan 
Growth Rate and Magnitude of Economy 
-
Ga 	 _1975k- 1976 1977 "_1978 1979 

Gross National Product 
In billion won (current prices) 9,052 11-242 13,480 15,726 18,332

-In-million $ (current prices) 18,702 22,485 
 26,959 3li453 36,664

In 	billion won (1975 prices) 10,656 11,615 12,660
-9,776 9052 

1-	 Growth Rate (percent) (7.4) (8.0)-- (9.0) (9.0) (9.0) 
GNP-Deflator (1975 = 100) 100.0 115.0 126.0 135.4 144.8 

Increase Rate.(percent) (24.4)- (15.0) 	 (7.0) (7.0) 

(1.0 (70 

-(.0
 
Population (thousand persons) 
" 	 35,281 ' 35,875' 236,450. 37,030 37,618 

ncrease Rate (percent) 	 .(1.69), (1.61) 1.59) (1.59) 
Per 	Capita GNP (current prices-. 
....Thousand won 
 257 3 3 370 425 487 

Dolars 
 530 -627 740 849 975 

SOURCE: EPB, Major Economic IIndicators- of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. 
1980 

21,389 

42,778 

13-800 

(9.0) 

155.0 

-(0.0)
(7.0)-

38,219 

(1.60) 
560 

1,119" 

1981-

24,939 

49,878 

15,042 

(9.0)-

--165.8,

(7.0)" 

38-835 

(1.60) 
642 

1,284 

Average" Remarks 
1977-1981 (B/As 
- 2.8 
- - 2.7 
- 1.7 
(19.0) -
..... 
-17.6) -
- 1.1 
(1.60) -
- 2.5 
- 2.4 
- -
TABLE 2
 
1976 Income Distribution
 
(won per month)
 
Percent 

Categoryl/ - 1976 Income in 1976 
Lowest 0 - 42,100 10.8 
Lower 42 101 - 70.200 31.7 
Lower Middle -70,201 -98,300 25.9 
Upper Middle 90,301 - 154,500 20.6 
High 	 154,501 and over .11.0 

Median 77,492
 
Mean 92,100
W 
o r -
NOTE: 	 1/ The use of income groups as target 

groups related to housing was first 

introduced as a part of the May 1975 

National Hiousng Policy exercise sup-

ported by AID technical assistance. 

The use of target groups has permitted
 
a sharpening of the focis regarding

the relationship of house types and
 
projects to their proposed benefi-

ciaries. The categories shown are a 

PADCO update of categories used in 

the National Housing Policy Paper

and they 	have not been reviewed by

AID or the Government of Korea. 

SOURCE: 	 U.S. Agency for International Devel­
opment, HG 005 Project Paper, Annex 5.
 
p. 55, USAID, 1976.
 
- TABLE 3 
Expenditures for Housing_­by Income Group
 
-. 	
- ­
-	 Expenditures 
Income Group on Percent
 (won per 	month) House'Rent Of Income
 
0 - 19,999 21600 13.20
20,000 -	27,999 3,500 12.32 z 
28.000 -	35,999 4,970 13.19
 
36.000 - 43.999 6070 12.97
 
44,000 - 51,999 7,660 13.64
 
52,000 -	59,999 3,730 13.28
 
60,000 - 67,999 9,260 12.29
 
68,000 and over 21,340 16.78
 
All 	 6,270 13.72
 
7" 
SOURCE; Bureau of Statistics, Economic
 
Planning Board. Annual Report
 
on the Family Income and Ex­
penditure Survey, 1972. Table
 
5. pp. 8081.
 
percentage spent on housing rent by actual renters and owner­
renters is remarkably constant, at roughly 13 percent of total
 
income for all except the highest-income groups who spend 17
 
percent. This relatively low percentage may reflect the
 
absence of long-term financing to acquire a house as well as
 
the need to save, rather than spend on housing, during the time
 
a household is renting. 2/
 
An end-user survey of occupants of the AID-financed 12­
and 15-pyong apartments built in 1974 showed that the range
 
of expenditures out of income for housing was roughly 20 to
 
40 percent. Assuming similar finance terms and a range of 20
 
to 35 percent to account for possible underreporting of income,
 
the figures shown in Table 4 can be derived.
 
Another approach to the question of affordability is to
 
compare existing housing floor space with incomes and popula­
tion. It has been possible to do this with two sets of data:
 
data from the national housing statistics for the big cities;
 
and data for the Oksoo upgrading project in Seoul. These show
 
average sizes of 1.74 and 1.51 pyongs per person, respectively.
 
It is not uncommon to find an entire family of five to six
 
people living in a single room and sharing a kitchen with sev­
eral other families. Thus, both sources of data lead to the
 
conclusion that, in order to provide housing for lower-income
 
groups directly, housing sizes must be contemplated which are
 
of the order of 6.0 and 9.0 pyongs, substantially smaller than
 
the 13-pyong units that had been the minimum size set by the
 
Korean Government.
 
1/ There are several ways to rent, the most common of
 
which is the ahonse system. The renter pays the landlord a
 
large sum (often of the order of W 1 million or more) in key
 
money but must return it without interest at termination of
 
the tenancy agreement. The income from key money investments
 
serves in lieu of rent. The contracts are normally negotiated
 
biannually or annually. When the renter cannot pay such a
 
large sum, an agreement can be reached whereby he pays some
 
key money and a low monthly rental or, in an extreme case,
 
pays no key money with the entire payment in a monthly rental
 
charge. The average Korean family, unless its income is very
 
high or unless it possesses inherited savings, will typically
 
save for 10 years or more before buying a house.
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TABLE 4
 
Value and Size of Affordable
 
Housing by Income Group
 
Size with Interest
 
RA~e of; 1/ .Rate of: 2/
 
Income Level 10 Percent 15 Percent 10 Percent 15 Percent
 
Value with Interest 

Category 

4.2
0 - 42,100 1,167,000 831,000 5.8
Lowest 

10.9 7.8
 Lower ' 42,101 - 70,200 2,184,300 1,555,500 11.7
W, 	 70,201 - 98,300 3,277,600 2,334,000 16.4
* 	 Lower Middle 

98,301 - 154,500 4,917,200 3,501,500 '24.6 -17.5
Upper-Middle 
 38.9 27.7
 
uigh . 154,501 or over 7,780,440 5,540,400 

NOTES: 	 1/., In'won. Based upon mortgage equal to 70 percent of total 
house cost. 2/ In pyongs. At Construction Cost of W 200,000 
per' pyong. 
SOURCE; 	 PADCO,,Inc.
 
AID was successful in convincing the Korean Government of,'
the validity of attempting the 7.5-pyong apartments constructee
in the 1976 loan program. Perhaps more importantly, AID has
 been a positive influence in bringing down the overall national
 
average size of dwelling unit built with public funds, even

though progress has not been as rapid in this area as AID would
have liked. It is an example of how negotiation, technical
 
assistance and capital assistance have been combined to revise
 
policy decisions.
 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOUSING STOCK
 
A few dominant themes stand out in Korean housing. First,
because of the severe winter climate, most Koreans seek rela­
tively high-quality housing with reliable, adequate heating and
insulation. 
There seems to be a conscious trade-off between
 
space and quality in which Koreans weight quality more than
people in most countries. Second, social and cultural patterns,

as well as scarcity of urban land, facilitate households living
in close proximity to each other. Renting a room or part of
 
a house is a very common practice in Korea. Third, there is
little, if any, long-term housing finance available. Thus,

most households save a substantial part of their lives in order
to purchase a house. Fourth, the overall level of income and

the extent of building skills are such that self-help building

may be a solution for a very small percent of new urban housing

construction. 
Finally, present levels and the relatively rapid

growth rate of income are sufficiently high that careful con­
sideration must be given to a housing stock that meets current
 
needs.and which will be considered desirable after 10 to 20
 
years.
 
As shown in Table 5, the housing situation in the urban
 
area of Korea worsened over the period 1960 to 1970. 
 This

situation is now beginning to stabilize as public programs are
increased and gs the population growth rate slows. The key
figure used in Korea to evaluate housing is the housing ratio
(the total number of houses divided by the number of house­holds). In 1960, the national urban housing ratio was 66.6
 
percent, a shortage of 33.4 percent. 
By 1970, as a result of

continued urban population growth and a shortage of housing

production, the urban hou,
sing supply ratio had decreased to 55
 percent. (See Table 6) Thus, 45 percent of all urban house­holds were living in housing with kitchen and bath facilities
designed for one household. The median size of all urban
 
housing was, in 1970, 13.2 pyongs and the average floor area
 per occupant was 1.74 pyongs. Approximately 31 percent of all

existing urban housing is under 10 pyongs. 
This suggests that
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TABLE 6 
Size of Urban Housing 1970 
(in pyongs) 
Total Housing_ Urban Housing
 
TABLE 5 	 Area Number- Area Number Area 
Korea Housing:Conditions 	 0 ­
'1960 - 1970 	 (50) 769,744 3,843.7 260,490 1,302.40 
1960 . 1970 (9.0) .654.736 5,892.6 167,057 1,503.50 
: ' 10 - 14 
Population (000) 24,989., -30,882 1 
(12.5) 1,405,673- 17,570.9 427,140 5,339.25
 
Household'ie . .61 	 -24-
Total5576 (20.0) 1,195,578 23,9116 40,255 16510
 
Total Households (000)- 4,198 5,576
 
25 39 	 - . .Urban Households (000) 1,231- 2,531 
Total iHouses (000) 3,464 4,360 - (37.5) 269,088- 10,090.8 96.192 3,682.20 
Tota Houes 	 8200464 4,36-k. Urban Houses (000) 82 1,39740 59
 
47,704 2,385.2 25,140- 1,257.00
78.2 (50.0)
Housing Supply Ratio 82.5 

-*"; -Urban Housing Ratio 66.6 55.2 
or more 
oo(75.0) - 17,288 1,296.6 11,440 858.00
_______________________69 
4 
. 4.'
-SOURCE: 	 Govermnent of Korea, Economic Plan-
 o 
64,996.4 1,397,714 22,107.40
ning Board Population and Housing - All 4,369,811-

Census Reports 1960 and 1970. ____ 

HOTES: 	 Mean area of urban houses.- 15.8 pyong. -

Median area of'urban houses - 13.2 pyong.
Mean area of all houses - 14.9 pyong.
 
Median area-of all houses - 12.7 pyong. 
SOURCE: 	 Government of Korea. Economic Planning-Board*. 
Population and Housing Census Reports 1970. -

a sizeable proportion of the population is able to live inhouses smaller than the current minimum size of public housing.
 
The single detached house is by-far the dominant mode of
housing in the cities at present. It accounts for 89 percent

of the urban housing stock. Increasing numbers of apartments

are being built in the larger cities, in response to increases
 
in land value. 
There has been, in the big cities, a tradition

of 2-, 3- or 4-story walkup flats, but these have been a rela.­tively small proportion of the national urban total. 
Approxi­
mately 92 percent of the total national housing stock is owned
by the primary occupant. Rental housing accounts for 5.5 per­
cent of housing. Many owner-occupied houses are partially

rented. It was estimated in 1972 that 51 percent of all house­
holds rent or lease their housing.
 
In response to these characteristics, AID and the Koreans

agreed that the appropriate housing response required relatively

high standards of construction and that some project types

used by AID in other countries, such as basic sites and services
 (without 
a core house) and reliance on self-help construction

methods, would not be appropriate for Korea. However, although

AID agreed with the assumption that new construction should
 
reflect the unique Korean situation, AID was concerned about
preservation of the existing housing stock, particularly those

called "illegal" by Koreans because they do not comply to local
 
codes and regulations of lot size.
 
Illegality of house tenure is a major problem in Korea,

particularly in the larger cities. (See Table 7) 
An illegal

house is defined as one that is located on land without the
 
permission of the owner, or as a house that violates the
 building codes. The popular belief is that most illegal set­
tlement occurred immediately after the Korean War, when housing

was on short supply and there were large inflows of refugees.

To some extent, this is true; but it is also true that much

squatting occurred subsequently. Also, squatting may occur on
 
a small scale even at present, as a result of rapid low-income

urban population growth and shortages of suitable, affordable
 
land and housing.
 
The total number of illegal houses in Korea was estimated
 in 1974 at 201,300, roughly 12 percent of the total urban
housing stock. In addition, there are many housing areas with
 
legal housing Lhat could be improved. Thus, the total housing

needs -- for new housing and for upgrading -- are very large.
 
AID, working through t3chnical assistance provided to the
 
Ministry of Construction on the formulation of a National
Housing Policy in 1974 and 1975, was successful in convincing

,Korean housing officials of the importance of preserving the
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TABLE 7
 
Status of';Illegal Houses
 
.. ber of 
Region - Illegal Houses 
Seoul 149,502
 
Busan 29,056
 
Kyongki-do 6,194
 
Kangwon-do
 
Chungchongbuk-do
 
Chungchongnam-do 3,242
 
Chullabuk-do 1,981
 
Chullanam-do 347
 
Kyongsangbuk-do4,734

Kyongsangnam-do 4 642
 
Cheju-do l__631
 
Total 201,329
 
NOTE: As of December 31, 1974.
 
)SOURCE:, Government of,Korea.
 
existing housing stock. The Korean Government included this
 
concept as one of the basic provisions of the May 1975 National
 
Housing Policy. This in turn provided the basis for intro­
ducing (through the HIG Program) the first Home Improvement
 
Program in Seoul in 1976. This is to be followed with similar
 
programs, also financed through HIG loans, in provincial cities
 
in 1977.
 
On the other hand, while the idea of upgrading projects
 
has been accepted (at least to the extent of allowing signif­
the Korean Government has not
icant demonstration projects), 

abandoned its demolition program. It is reported that in
 
Seoul some 20,000 illegal housing units were demolished during
 
1976. This is an obvious contradiction to the objective of
 
It also undermines the
preserving the existing housing stock. 

concept of upgrading, because the areas selected for upgrading
 
are not inherently different from the areas in which demoli­
tion is occurring. This illustrates the basic problem of
 
implementing a National Housing Policy when multiple govern­
ment agencies are involved.
 
The need to sharply curtail demolition is of obvious,con­
cern to AID. It is the focus of negotiations for the future
 
of the HIG Program in Korea.
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PART ONE 
THE AID-KOREAN DIALOGUE ON 'HOUSING POLICY
 

Chapter'Il'> 
THE"EARLY YEARS: A1971T10 1972
 
From the beginning, AID was concerned about the impact of

"its proposed HIG Program on overall Korean National Housing
Policy. This chapter attempts to trace the main streams of
this dialogue, as it effected the emerging program objectives

of the specific loan agreements.
 
It is fair to say that there was little emphasis on the
housing sector in Korea prior to 1971. 
 Only 875,000 housing
units had been built or financed by the public sector (some 16
percent). 
 This was, in fact, a reflection of a deliberate

strategy on the part of the Korean Government to channel invest­ment into what was felt to be more productive sectors. Other
than this overall policy of deemphasizing, there was no specific
articulated housing policy at that time. 
Therefore, the AID­sponsored Pre-Investment Survey o! 1971 can be considered the
start of the housing policy dialogue and the start of the HIG
Program in Korea.
 
A. THE AID 1971 PRE-INVESTMENT SURVEY
 
The 1971 AID Pre-Investment Survey i/ was intended, pri­marily, as a guide to AID action in Kore&. 
It was prepared by
three experts in a few months time. 
 Its basic purpose was to
identify the structure of the Korean housing sector, key 
.
programs, overall housing needs, and the methods of financing

and administering the housing program.
 
The report included recommendations for action within
three time perspectives: 
 immediate-action, intermediate-steps,

and long-term goals and objectives, as described below.
 
3/ U.S. Agency for International Development. Pre-Invest­mentSurvey Report: Housing Guaranty Program, Republic of
Korea, 1971. 
 USAID, October 1971.
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1. The Pre-Investment Survey report recommended immediate

action on a public sector negotiated housinq program followed,
 
as soon as possible, by a private sector competitive program.
Both were targeted at middle-income families and were to operate

within the existing institutional framework. They were to
 incorporate several demonstration featuzes including a mortgage

adjustment clause, a maintenance-of-value mechanism, and pre­
payment and early sales penalties. Possible sites were
 identified for the public program as were sites and ddvelopers

for the competitive program.
 
2. The intermediate changes called for more systematic

organization of the Korean Housing Bank (KHB) and development

of a maintenance-of-value instrument for use with the Bank's
 
existing program. it was recommended that participation of

employers in projects be supported to generate savinqs and
 
housing for workers. Formation was recommended under regula­
tions of privately-financed savings and home owners banks
 
exclusively devoted to housing. It was suggested that KNHC
 divest itself of rental apartments for foreigners and that it
 
abandon the condominium apartment development planned for the
 
upper-income market. In addition, it was noted that KNHC could

make available land and technical assistance for private-sector
 
sponsors of middle-income hous4iq developments.
 
3. Long-range goals stressed a need for a new system for
housing finance designed for the specific purpose of encour­
aging savings, on the one hand, and providing for construction
 
and long-term financing of housing, on the other. The new
 
system was to have been composed of privately-financed stock

corporations under government supervision, with a government
 
agency acting as a banker's bank and regulatory agency. It
 
was noted that the existing KHB could either be transformed
 into the supervisory and secondary market agency or dissolved,

with its branches and main banking operations offered for sale
 
to the private sector. It was recommended that KHC and the

various local governments reclaim and acquire vacant land for
 
future developments.
 
Considerable emphasis was put on lower-cost housing.for

the very low-income and irregularly-employed population who
 
"cannot afford decent, safe and sanitary housing on an unsub­
sidized basis." 
 This was to have been achieved by development

of "experimental and innovative programs," although the content

of these was not described. It was emphasized that a sustained
 
program for low-income groups needed to be developed, as
 
opposed to the sporadic efforts undertaken previously.
 
The 1971 Pre-Investment Survey was undertaken within the

overall housing policy of AID at that time, which was much
 
more concerned with increasing housing production than with
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Figure 9. Sung Nam, near Seoul. Water supplied at
 
community taps,
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Figure 10. Apartments built by muni­
cipality: Cheonju.
 
Figure 11. Small houses built by nmunicipality: 
Cheonju. 
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specifying the beneficiary target groups to receive the housing.
It, also, should be remembered that in 1971 the failure of
heavily-subsidized public housing for low-income groups as a

national solution was well recognized by most international
 
experts but that the new approaches of sites and services
housing and settlement upgrading were not yet well understood
 
or practiced. Therefore, the recommendations of the report

were consistent with the "state of the art" at that time.
 
It is interesting to note, as mentioned in the Ihtroduc­
tion, that in the beginning AID and Korean objectives were not
 
very wide apart. Therefore, overall housing policy was notinitially a major part of the dialogue.
 
The Pre-Investment Survey report did identify the basic
problems of the Korean housing finance system and, particularly,
the policies of the Korean Housing Bank. 
This major area has
been brought up continually by AID's technical assistance
 
missions to Korea, up to and including the Pratt Report of 1977,
but no positive response has ever been obtained from the KHB
 
or the Korean Government that address the problems identified.
 
There was no involvement of Korean housing professionals
in preparation of the 1971 Pre-Investment Survey, as was to
 
occur later when the National Housing Policy was prepared in
1975. 
 In fact, the Korean Government was independently
preparing a number of significant actions affecting housing
policy which were adopted in 1972. Few, if any, of AID's
1971 recommendations were included in Korea's 1972 policy and
 program package, other than the commitment to the first HIG
loan which resulted in the 
Banpo Apartments for upper-middle­income people. Nonetheless, the Korean 1972 housing proposals

represent a major milestone in the Korean housing sector.
 
In 1972 the Koreans produced a much-improved legal

structure for housing, based upon their own perceptions and

analyses. 
These were reflected in the 1972 Housing Construction
 
Promotion Law and in the 1972-1981 Plan for the Construction

of 2,500,000 Houses. These actions by the Koreans were under­
standably followed by a period in which it was their desire
 to begin to implement the system which had been developed on
 paper rather than to consider further institutional changes of
the kind supported by AID. Thus, even though there were sub­
stantial areas in which change was still necessary, AID adopted
the position of continuing to finance projects, while at the
 
same time entering into a sustained policy dialogue with the
Koreans, rather than attempting to influence policy directly

as a condition of making loans.
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B. THE 1972 NATIONAL
 
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION PROMOTION LAW 4/
 
The 1972 National Housing Construction Promotion Law
 
established a National Housing Policy Council of key housing
 
agencies and a National Housing Fund to be administered by
 
KHB. Other important legislation affecting housing included
 
the 1941 Land Readjustment Law, the 1962 City Planning Law
 
and the 1963 Development of Natural Territory Act -- the
 
basis for the current national land use policy. The funds
 
were to come from compulsory purchase of national housing
 
bonds related to the purchase of business licenses and building
 
permits for upper-income housing, loans from the Government
 
or international sources, funds from a housing lottery, and
 
other methods as prescribed by Presidential decree.
 
The funds were to be used fo,: construction of national
 
housing, purchase and development of land for national housing,
 
repayment of loans and national housing bonds and such other
 
projects as deemed necessary for promotion of national housing
 
construction.
 
In addition, the law provided for the Minister of Con­
struction to draw up a National Housing Construction Plan and
 
implementation guidelines each year (in agreement with the
 
Ministers of Economic Planning and Finance) and to direct the
 
local self-governing bodies of KHC and KHB to execute the plans
 
and guidelines.
 
The 1973 Enforcement Decree set conditions for the pur­
chase of national housing bonds and limits for the-types of
 
housing to be financed'by the National Housing Fund. Among
 
the most important of these, for purposes of housing policy,
 
are requirements that national housing be not less than 13
 
pyongs or more than 25 pyongs and that the minimum lot size
 
be 27 pyongs. Furthermore, national housing is to be con­
structed in lots of not less than 100 units each, whether by.
 
private or public builders.
 
AID, beginning in 1974, utilized this Korean structure
 
as the underpinning for its emphasis on the-development df'a
 
comprehensive National Housing Policy.
 
4/ For a more detailed description of the 1972 Housing
 
Construction Promotion Law and Plan for the Construction of
 
2,500,000 Houses, see Ministry of Construction, Government of
 
Korea. Status of Housing, updated4 Available from the Min­
istry of Construction.
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C. THE 1972 PLAN'FOR THE'
 
CONSTRUCTION OF 2j500,000 HOUSES
 
More or less simultaneously with the 1972 Housing Con­
struction Promotion Law, the Ministry of Construction prepared
 
for the Third and Fourth Five-Year Plans a "Plan for Construc­
tion of 2,500,000 Houses." This was, basically, the first
 
systematic attempt to translate the housing policy as it
 
existed in legislation at that time into a plan of action. It
 
included performance targets against which progress could be
 
measured consistent with the resources expected to be available,
 
with roles assigned for each major group of public agencies and the
 
private sector. Under this plan, a total of 2,500,000 houses
 
were to be constructed, 1,000,000 during the Third Five-Year
 
Plan and 1,500,000 during the Fourth Five-Year Plan. (See
 
Table 8) The government was to be responsible for 1,109,000
 
units, with 860,000 to be constructed by the Central Government
 
(inicluding KNHC) and an additional 173,000 by KHB. The target
 
was to reduce the national housing shortage ratio by 10.4 per­
cent, from 77.8 in 1970 to 88.2 percent in 1981. (See Tables
 
10 and li'on pages 42 and 43)
 
The 1972 Plan, had it been fully implemented, would have
 
reprqsented a threefold increase in housing construction and an
 
eightfold increase in public housing construction.
 
The method of financing the Plan for Construction of
 
2,500,000 Houses was to have been the National Housing Fund
 
which was, in turn, financed by the sale of compulsory bonds,
 
a housing lottery and contributions out of the national budget.
 
No financial forecasts were made of actual'resources available.
 
The Plan, therefore, was largely a statement of objectives
 
which were to be revised in the light of actual experience.
 
TABIZ 6
 
1972 Housing Construction Plan,
 
1972- 1972- 1*977-- . 1975- Remarks 
1981 1976 1972h 1973' 1974 1975 1976 1981 . 1977 1979 1979 1980- 1981i 1981 (8/) 
Number of (1,498) (722) 5,774 5,934 6,071 6,220' 6,372 (776) 6,528 6,682 6.33 6,906 7,148 (1.077) 123.9
 
Households Y 
Urban Areas (1,910) (910) 2.705 2,95f 3.134 3,318 3,505 (1.000) 3.694 3,889 4.065 4,30 4,50S 41.3711 166.S 
Rural A(re4s (-188) 3,069 2,976 2,937 , 2,903 2,867 (-224) 2,834 2,793 2,748 2,677 2,641 (-294) 86.1 
Number of Houses (1,860) (525) 4,516 4,592 4,692 4,831 4,989 (1,328) 5.176 5,402 5.670 5.975 6,317 11,625) 139.9 
Urban Areas (2,139) (647) 1,677 1,782 1,904 2.065 2,244 (1,485) 2,464 2,719 3,017 3,355 3,729 11,825) 222.4 
Rural Areas (-279) (-122) 2,839- 2,810 2,788 2.766-r, 2,745 (-157) 2,714 2.683 2,653 2,620 2,588 1-200) 91.2 
wJ Dumber of Houses
 
143 160 200 220 1.667 252 290 335 375 415 2,087 377.3
 tj Constructed Y 2,500 833 110 
Urban Areas 2,366 743 95 128 140 180 200 1,623 242 280 325 368 403 2,003 429.5 
Rural Areas 134 90 15 15 20, 20^ 20 44 10 10 10 7 7 84 -46.7 
Public Sector 700 250 17.5 43.4, -45.5 70.0 __74.0 _,450 80 85 90- 95 100 594 :571.4 
Private Sector 1.800 583 92.5 99.6 144.5, 130.0 146.0 1,217 172 205 245 280 315 --1,493 1340.5 
Wuwmr of H~ousing' •6 -6 7 70 7 6
 
640 301 58 - 60 60 61- 62 339 63 -66 67 70 73 462Decrease 2_ 1 
Urban Artas 227 89 is 16 18 19 21 138 22 25 27 30, 34 178-i--

Rural Areas 413 - 212 -43 144 -42 42, 41 - 201 41 .41 40 40 39 ' 284_) ­
use/Household - - 78.2 77.4 77.3- 77.7 78.3 - 79.3 80.8 83.0 85.5 86.4- - -Ratio Y_ -_ - I 
Urban Areas - - 62.0, 60.2 60.8 62.2 64.0 - 66.7 69.9 73.9-, 77.9 :8,2.8 - -
Rural Areas - - 92.5 94.4 94.9 95.1, 95.7 - 95.8 96.1 96.S'- 97.9 -:97.9 - -
NaES: i _ In thousand units. I/ Percent
Zn thousands. 

ministry of Construction, 1972 Housing Plan.
-SOUIRCE; 
Chapter III
 
PREPARATION OF'A NATIONAL'HOUSING'
 
'POLICY AND CONSTRUCTION PLAN (1973-1976)
 
At the end of 1974, it was apparent that the overall level
 
of housing construction was increasing annually while actual
 
construction was falling behind the 1972 Construction Plan.
 
During the three-year period 1972 to 1974, 592,000 units were
 
built (.83 percent of the Plan target). However, the public

sector built or financed only 106,000 units (60 percent of
 
the public sector target). Even with this shortfall, the
 
public sector had approximately doubled its rate of construc­
tion over the 1960 period. 5/
 
In 1973, as the first HIG loan was in execution with a
 
second loan soon to be requested by KNHC and the Korean
 
Government, AID moved to encourage further development of a
 
comprehensive National Housing Policy, by making a commitment
 
to prepare a policy during 1974 a condition of the second
 
loan. This document eventually was completed in May 1975. 6/
 
A. THE MAY 1975 HOUSING POLICY
 
The'Ministryof Construction was given responsibility

for preparing the technical basis for the National Housing

'
Policy., The Housing Bureau of MOC took the lead and additional
 
support was provided by staff seconded from other Ministries,
 
5/ See Chapter VI: The Korean Public Housing Program

Conteit and Table 14, Korean Public Housing Achievements.
 
6/ For a more detailed description, see Government of
 
Korea7 Ministry of Construction. Korean Housing Policy and
 
Long-Term Housing Construction Plan. Ministry of Construction,
 
May 1975.
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The technical group reported to a senior-level,
KHB and KHC. 

inter-ministerial housing policy committee which was chaired
 
by the Vice Minister for Construction. Additional support
 
was to be provided by outside Korean consulting firms. AID
 
was to provide short-term, international technical assist­
ance. 7/
 
Work on preparing the National Housing Policy proceeded
 
A first draft was reviewed in Januar.y 1975
throughout 1974. 

This draft
which was followed by a final draft in May 1975. 

was officially signed by the Minister of Construction as
 
approved. However, AID and the Korean staff who had worked
 
on the policy document had hoped that it would have been
 
formally approved by the President of Korea or by the Council
 
The fact this did not happen has undermined,
of Ministers. 

to some extent, the usefulness of the results. 8/
 
The housing policy was essentially a two-pronged approach
 
directed at maximizing the net addition to the national housing
 
stock, on the one hand, and at improving the quality of that
 
housing stock, on the other. The simultaneous pursuit of
 
these two fundamental objectives was, however, somewhat contra­
dictory, as the process of upgrading the standards of housing
 
must necessarily limit the maximization of net additions to
 
the housing stock given the limited resources available. This
 
conflict, which has been a constant in the housing policy
 
dialogue, has never been resolved in operational terms. None­
theless, even though the Korean National Housing Policy was
 
7/ AID took the position that only if the Koreans them­
selves were clearly responsible for technical work on the
 
Housing Policy could the result be meaningful. It was felt
 
that a foreign team could not prepare a National Housing Policy
 
which would result in other than a paper document. Therefore,
 
AID's assistance was limited to help in designing the work
 
program for the Korean technical staff, to reviewing draft reports
 
and to informal suggestions and general dialogue. Assistance
 
was accomplished by several short-term missions of two to
 
three weeks each, during the course of Housing Policy prepara­
tion, by PADCO, Inc. personnel retained by the Office of
 
Housing, AID.
 
8/ For a more detailed discussion, see "The Experience
 
of thi Korean Government in Housing Policy Formulation," PADCO
 
Inc., January 1976. This work was financed by the Office of
 
Housing, AID.
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uneven in"its presentation.and technical; underpitrning, its_
 
preparation broke substantial new ground in Korea.
 
The main objectives of the National Housing Policy are
 
as follows:
 
1.. To reduce the overall national housing shortage
ratio from an estimated 77.8 percent inl1970 
to 88.4 percent by 1981. 
2., 	To raise the average dwelling space to 5.0
 
pyongs per capita in a 3-room housing unit in
 
the 1980s.
 
3. 	To improve environmental conditions and servi­
ces, including roads, water, sewerage, electri­
city and street lights.
 
A4.. To give priorit7 to urban housing construction,

since the housing supply rate is lowest in the
 
urban areas.
 
5. To maintain the existing housing stock to the
 greatest extent possible and to impose restric­
tions on the spontaneous removal of existing'
 
houses built to certain-standaids.
 
The 	housing delivery system was contemplatedas follows:
 
1. 	Target groups were identified on the basis of
 
income and agencies of government were given

responsibility for supplying housing to them.
 
Local authorities were given responsibility

for housing improvement and rental housing

construction for lowest-income groups and
 
sales housing for low-income groups. The KNHC
 
was given responsibility for rental housing

for lowest-income groups and housing construc­
tion for sale for the low- and lower-middle­
income groups. Most middle-income housing,

and all high-income housing, was to be supplied.

by the private sector with some financial
 
support for middle-income groups. Financial
 
support was also to be provided to commercial
 
builders.
 
'2. Land development was to be the responsibility

of the local authorities, using existing legal

mechanisms such as the land readjustment
 
process.
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3. 	Measures were to be undertaken for development
 
of low-priced house-building techniques and
 
materials.
 
4. 	Home improvement programs were to be undertaken
 
by local authorities, to legalize unlicensed
 
housing and upgrade neighborhoods and housing.
 
stock.
 
5. 	A program was to be established to register
 
building materials enterprises and control the
 
quality of materials.
 
6. 	Standard designs were to be produced and distrib­
uted, to facilitate better construction and
 
performance in situations where an architect
 
was 	unavailable.
 
7. 	Administrative functions were to be rationalized
 
and strengthened, principally by creating a
 
housing bureau in MOC (which has been achieved)
 
and by strengthening housing sections, bureaus
 
and subsections in the local governments. 9/
 
8. 	A recognition of the limitations of the housing
 
finance system,and proposals to increase housing
 
finance were included in the system. However,
 
the proposals primarily involved increases in
 
funding from budget and foreign sources and
 
did not fundamentally affect the basic Korean
 
housing finance system.
 
By far the most significant objective included in the
 
Housing Policy was the commitment to "preserve the existing
 
housing stock." This represented a complete reversal of
 
previous Korean Government policy. It gave official sanction
 
to AID's vigorous efforts to introduce upgrading in Seoul's
 
9/ AID involvement in Korean Housing Policy stressed the
 
neqd fo create a Housing Bureau with housing policy responsi­
bility in the Ministry of Construction from the previous small
 
Housing and City Planning Bureau, with a strengthening of the
 
staff. The objective has been to achieve a staff unit that
 
could interact with the Housing Policy Committee, preparing
 
information for them on key policy and administrative issues.
 
It appears that objective is now close to fruition in 1977, some
 
two 	years later.
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illegal settlement areas (this effort eventually materialized
 
in the 1976 HIG loan).
 
As will be discussed later, this policy commitment cannot
 
yet be considered operational, but its overall impact on future
 
Korean housing programs is potentially enormous. In part, the
 
failure to include a key word has led to difficulty with the
 
City of Seoul in implementing the policy directive. The policy

did not define the "housing stock" to be preserved. Wheroas
 
the drafters of the policy intended to include all housing

stock (both illegal and legal), others in Korea interpreted

this commitment initially to mean only to "preserve all legal

housing stock." Their argument was that, by definition, it
 
is against the law to preserve housing stock that is "illegal."
 
The second major accomplishment of the Housing Policy

document was the introduction, for the first time, of target
 
groups based on income categories as directly related to
 
housing programs and policies. This use of precise definitions
 
has allowed a much clearer discussion of the potential bene­
ficiaries of housing programs. Unfortunately, the Fourth
 
Five-Year Plan's section on housing failed to continue this
 
use of target groups, as will be discussed later.
 
The greatest shortcoming of the Housing Policy, other
 
than conflicts in basic objectives, was the ommission of'spe­
cific housing finance policy recommendations with regard to such
 
questions as subsidies, interest rates and the role of KHB.
 
When pressed on these matters, Korean drafters of the
 
Housing Policy responded that if they had attacked these
 
issues directly in the policy document, there would have been
 
a substantial risk that the policy would never have been
 
adopted. These matters remained as unfinished business and
 
AID has taken them up again through the 1977 Pratt Report

(discussed later).
 
B. THE 1975 CONSTRUCTION PLAN
 
Accompanying the National Housing Policy was a revised
 
construction plan through 1981.' The revised plan set the
 
same targets as the 1972 to 1981 Plan but reallocated the
 
level of effort between the public and the private sectors.
 
Public sector responsibility was reduced from the original

692,500 units to 450,000 units, a reduction of 35 percent.

The private sector was to pick up the difference.
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Since the original plan was already behind targets in
 
both the public and private sectors by 1975, the revised plan
 
shoed actual construction for the years 1972 to 1974 and set
 
more modest targets for 1975 and 1976 (some 80,000 units less
 
than the original plan), but then accelerated the construction
 
tar-gets for the remainder of the period through 1981. (See
 
Taile 9) For example, the original target for 1981 was 338,000
 
TABLE 9
 
May 1975 Housing Construction Plan
 
(inthousand units and billions of won)
 
4 T 
1975 1976 1977 1978' 1979 1980 1981 Total
 
Number of Houses 
-
to be 0 220 252 290 335 375 415 2;087 
Constructed 
-
Public 
Private 
70 
130 
74-
146 
80 
172 
85 
205 
90 
245 
95 
280 
100 
315 
597 
1,493 
Amount of-
Investment '326- 377 ,.-- 454 553 670 788 -913 '4,081 
Public 
-74 v'801 95 110 130 155 185 -829" 
Private 252 297 359 443 540 633 728 3,282 
Cost per Unit 
- Public 
Private-
- * **. 
- 1,389, 
2,198 
SOURCE: Ministry of Construction, Korea National"-Housing Policy
and Long-Term Construction Plan. 
units while in the revised plan it was 415,000. (See Tables
 
10 and 11 on pages 42 and 43)
 
The 1975 Plan made one major new contribution to thinking

about housing plan targets. It presented considerable analyt­
ical material on necessary inputs and resource mobilization
 
to achieve the targets proposed. It recognized that it would
 
be necessary to have an expansion of the national housing funds
 
from 3.2 to 5.6 percent of GNP. This increase was to be
 
achieved in part through the expansion of public housing funds.
 
Included in the measures suggested were increased allocations
 
from central and local government funds and increased private
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contract savings programs. More foreign investment was also
 
to be sought.
 
As important as this analytical work was in adding an
 
important element to the methodology of housing professionals

in Korea, it should have been interpreted as a clear signal
 
that the 1975 Housing Construction Plan was as unrcalistic as
 
the original 1972 Plan. Since the Ministry of Economic Plan­
ning had limited the housing sector to 3.2 percent of.GNP in
 
the third plan period, a jump to 5.6 percent of GNP for the
 
fourth plan should have been considered unrealistic at the
 
outset. On the other hand, the MOC (the "advocates" of
 
housing) contend that, by preparing their 1975 Plan, they
 
were in a better position to "negotiate" a higher allocation
 
of GNP for housing in the fourth plan with EPB. And, indeed,
 
the 	allocation did go up to 3.8 percent (see discussion on
 
the 	fourth plan which follows).
 
C. AID FOLLOW-UP ON THE HOUSING POLICY
 
AID accepted the May 1975 Housing Policy as full compli­
ance with the commitment in the HIG loan of 1974, because it
 
was a major step forward and included the policy objective in
 
support of the Home Improvement Program which AZD was eager to
 
promote. Nonetheless, AID-recognized the fact that the
 
National Housing Policy fell substantially short on many issues
 
which needed to be addressed. As a result, AID negotiated
 
into the two HIG loans proposed for 1975 a series of follow-up
 
studies on issues requiring further attention. The project
 
paper included the following work areas for MOC to take up

in the following year.
 
1. 	A survey of housing loan interest rates aimed
 
at reducing subsidies or at reducing subsidies
 
for all but the lowest-income groups.
 
2. 	An investigation of the use of key money by
 
different income groups and into how lower­
income groups could be assisted in the pur­
chase or lease of housing.
 
3. 	A major study of housing administration and
 
finance institutions.
 
4. 	Further consideration of the appropriate role'
 
of local governments in housing.
 
,5.<;Further consideration of the role of the
 
private sector.
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6. Review of the various special-purpose govern­
ment housing programs to ensure integration
 
with the overall housing policy.
 
7. An early and thoro3ugh review of the 1976 Annual
 
Plan, in order to ensure that the resources
 
assumed are available, that the private sector
 
has been considered and that the implementation
 
plan is useful in administration of the program.
 
The KNHC prepared one study 10/ and MOC contracted, with
 
the same Korean consulting firm tR-at participated in the orig­
inal housing policy work, to undertake the other required
 
studies. 11/ The consultant produced several massive reports,
 
containin-much valuable data and descriptive material.
 
Unfortunately, the main points of concern at the policy level
 
were neglected, as only superficial or unworkable proposals
 
were developed. AID did not provide any technical assistance
 
during this stage of the work. Its involvement might have
 
helped focus the Korean consulting firm and might have ensured
 
a better coverage of the key issues. As a result, the funda-

Mental issues of finance and administration still remained
 
essentially untouched while another year passed. Meanwhile,
 
the draft Fourth Five-Year Plan was prepared during 1976.
 
10/ Korea Housing Corporation. Study on Raising of
 
Housing Funds and Housing Financing System. Korea Housing
 
Corporation, 1976.
 
11/ Song, Byung-Nak and Struyk, Raymond J. Korean
 
Housin: Economic Appraisal and Policy Alternative . 7 orean
 
Development Institute, May 1976.
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Chapter IV
 
THE HOUSING SECTOR OF THE
 
FOURTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN
 
AND HOUSING FINANCE PROPOSALS
 
The Economic Planning Board was busy throughout 1976 pre­
paring the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-1981). The MOC met
 
with the EPB, from time to time, regarding content of the
 
Plan's housing sector. MOC actively promoted the recommenda­
tions of the National.Housina Policy and he 1975 Housing Con­
struction Plan. 
The results of the Fourth Five-Year Plan's
 
housing sector draft 12/ were something less than MOC desired
 
but, in many ways, they supported the conclusions which AID
 
.had been promoting, at least in some areas. 13/
 
A. THE KEY COMPONENTS
 
The key components of the Fourth Five-Year Plan's housing
 
sector were as follows:
 
1. 	The overall annual growth rate of GNP is fore­
cast at 9.0 percent. The total level of
 
resources is expected to be 3.8 percent of GNP,
 
up from the 3.2 percent of the GNP during the
 
Third Plan but substantially below the MOC pro­
posal of 5.6 per:ent.
 
12/ See: Ministry of Construction, Housing Section.
 
Fourtf-Housing Construction Plan. Final Drafto Ministry of
 
Construction, October 22, 1976. ,
 
13/ During this time, the World Bank sponsored a housing

finanE expert to work with the Korean Development Institute
 
directly for EPB. The report on this effort generally supports

AID's view of the issues, but it seems to have had little over­
all 	impact on the housing sector of the Fourth Five-Year Plan.
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The total number of houses to be constructed
2. 

by the public sector is increased slightly
 
the May 1975 Plan, from 450,000
relative to 

to 512,000. The total public and private
 
program is reduced to 2,103,000 for the com­
bined 1972 to 1981 period, a recognition that
 
the private sector is unlikely to provide as
 
much as originally contemplated. (See Tables
 
10 and 11).
 
TABLE 10 
Fourth Plan Housing 
Construction Program
 
(in billion won, 1975 prices) 
S1971­
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1981 
Investment
 
Public 81 107 109 117 129 138 600
 
Private 299 326 366 399 451 500 2,040
 
I- -----

Total
 580 637 2,641380 475
Investment 394 433 516 
-Housing 

Units to be 
Constructed 
Public 63 68', 95 94 ib'0 108 115 512 
Private 117 122 o 125 146 '160 182 205! 818 
Total Units 180- 180 -220' 240 260- 290 -320, 1,330 
Expenditure

Per unit 
Public 1,172 
Private 2,494 
NOTE: 	 Housing constxuction'plan by supply agency and it's 
investment program. 
SOURCE: 'Ministry ofi Construction,' Fourth Housing Plan.
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- TABLE 11
 
Comparison of Housing-Constrction Plans
 
(Number of Units x 000).
 
Ten-Year:-
 Housing Policy And Fourth'Housing

Housing Plan (1972) Construction Plan (1975) Construction Plan (1976)

Total Public Total Public Total 
 Public
 
1972- 110 16.8 
 110 17.5 110 *17.5
 
1973 181 -68.2 143 43.4 
 143 43.4
1974' 208 91.7 160 45.5 160 45.5
 
1975. 241 112.0- - 200 70.0 180 
-631976- -260 127.3- 220 74.0 180 58 
1977 -269 126.3 252 80.0 220 95
 
1978 279 .131.1 290 85.0 240 - 94 
1979 301 138.2 335 90.0 260 
 100"

1980 313- 144.0 375 95.0 290 .108,
1981 -338: 152.9
- 415 100.0 320 115
 
1977-1981 1,500 
 692 5 1,667 
- 450.0 1,330 
- +512' ­
1972-1981 2,500 1,108.5 + - 2,500 700.0 2,103 739.4
 
Source: Ministry of,-Construction.
 
3. 	 'In the Fourth Plan, the estimated current popu­
lation is increased, as is the population fore­
cast for 1981. Thus, the current housing supply 
ratio appears poorer on paper although, obviously, 
it is the same in reality -- 75.2 percent in 1977 
as opposed to the MOC estimate of 79.3 percent. 
The 1981 objective of the housing supply ratio 
is set at 79.8 percent, down substantially from
 
the 88.4 percent of the MOC May 1975 Plan. 4See
 
Table 12).
 
TABLE 12
 
House/Household Ratio
 
Housing Policy and Fourth Housing
 
C AConstruction Plan
onstruction Plan-

- (1975) 	 (1976)
 
1972 78.2
 
1973 77.4
 
1974 77.3
 
1975 77.7 7,.5
 
1976 78 3, 74.6­
1977 79.3 75.2
 
1978 80.8 76.1
 
1979 83.0 77.0
 
1980 85.5 78.3
 
1981 88.4 79.8
 
SOURCE:,* Ministry.of Construction.
 
4. 	The emphasis in the public program is to be
 
placed on the construction of small-scale
 
housing (an average of 13 pyongs) in medium
 
and small provincial cities.
 
5. 	The living space standard per person has been
 
reduced downward to between 3.1 and 3.2 pyongs
 
per 	person on the aveiage. This appears to
 
be much more realistic than the standard of
 
5.0 pyongs per person listed in the MOC 1975
 
Plan.
 
'6. 	Continued emphasis is to be placed upon hous­
:ing lot creation.
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The Fourth Five-Year Plan reflects a more realistic
 
assessment of possible accomplishments in the housing sector in
 
the years ahead. The substantial reduction of objectives from
 
those of the MOC 1975 Plan are in line with the general direc­
tion of AID's concerns and objectives. Nonetheless, the Fourth
 
Five-Year Plan is, unfortunately, remiss in failing to pick up
 
the most important points of the MOC Plan and the National
 
Housing Policy. It is-silent on the need to preserve the
 
existing housing stock -- which should be of the highest pri­
ority and is certainly compatible with the remainder of the
 
housing sector recommendations. It, also, fails to utilize
 
the concept of the target groups introduced in the MOC Plan
 
and Policy. This concept would have been extremely helpful \
 
to the housing agencies and MOC in disaggregating the targets
 
of the Fourth Five-Year Plan into individual action programs.
 
Finally, the fundamental issues of housing finance and
 
housing administration were once again bypassed with no prog­
ress being made on these key issues. These issues are of
 
such a nature that, without some reforms, it is unlikely that
 
even the more modest targets of the Fourth Five-Year Plan
 
can be achieved. In reaction to this continuing problem, AID
 
itself finally commissioned a study of housing finance in
 
late 1976; the report was published in early 1977.
 
B. 	THE AID 1977 HOUSING
 
FINANCE REPORT
 
The AID Housing Finance Report was undertaken by Richard 
T. Pratt.and Associates. It was presented in draft form 'in
 
Korea 	 in February, 1977. 
,The Pratt report focused on the KHB a/which, as previ­
ously mentioned, has been an institution with-little or no
 
i/ Except for a few isolated and relatively insignifi­
cant instances, including life insurance companies, there
 
is only one source of long-term mortgage finance for housing:
 
theKorean Housing Bank. The KHB was established in 1967
 
to provide housing funds for low-inccme families. The total
 
assets of the Bank as of October 19, 1976, were W 208 billion
 
with the bulk (70.1 percent) committed in the housing area.
 
The KHB has five major sources of funds: deposits,
 
housing debentures, compulsory ,7tional housing bonds,, housing,_,
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interest in AID participation. The study was undertakeo with­
out a Xorean counterpart team of the kind assembled for the 
Housing Policy. It therefore represents only the views of the 
foreign experts involved.
 
lottery funds and borrowings from the government. Approximately 
55 percent of the Bank's present income derives from deposits 
and debentures, with the balance from the bonds, lottery and 
government. The funds mobilized are used for a number of,--- ­
purposes, primarily in the area of housing. Uses include 
loans to local governments for housing, loans to KNHC for 
housing and housing construction, loans to contractors f6r site 
development and building, loans to individuals for housing and
 
private housing and short-term commercial loans and enterprise
 
loans.
 
The interest rates charged and the terms of the loan
 
vary with the purpose and the source of funds. Thus, loans
 
for housing constructed by local governments are for 20 years
 
at 4.0 percent interest, while those to KNHC are for 15 years
 
at 8.0 percent interest. According to a senior staff member
 
of KNHC, few, if any, loans are being made at present to
 
contractors, as a result of a general shortage of funds. Loans
 
for housing site development are for three years at 17 percent.
 
In most cases, housing purchase loans are substantially below
 
market rates. This gives the borrower an implicit subsidy
 
amounting to between 40 and 50 percent of the loan amount. Thus,
 
those persons fortunate enough to acquire public housing are
 
substantially better off than those who do not. The subsidy
 
in the finance program, in turn, limits the ability of the
 
governuent to expand the program to the level required to
 
reach a broader range of the population.
 
The prospects for the future level of funding of the
 
KHB are only moderate under present policies. The bonds can
 
be made to apply to more transactions and the rates can be
 
increased. Clearly, the extent to which this can be done is
 
limited. Furthermore,. the proceeds must be used in part,

beginning in 1978, to retire already outstanding bonds.
 
Lottery funds are also likely to be relatively limited. The
 
greatest opportunity appears to be to attract savings deposits,
 
but participation-is relatively low at present because of
 
low interest rates offered on savings compared to the rates
 
obtainable in the private "curb market."
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The key recommendations of the Pratt report were as fol­
lows: 15
 
1. 	To conduct a study to determine whether hous­
ing finance needs can be met within the given

structure and, in particular, whether or not
 
the existing KHB should remain as a retail
 
Lender or be upgraded to a wholesale lender or
 
joint wholesale/retail lender. This is an idea
 
which dates back to the original 1971 Pre-

Investment Survey.
 
2. 	To simplify the KHB deposit structure into a
 
few basic accounts.
 
3. 	To give KHB greater discretion in paying inter­
est on deposits or restructuring all interest
 
rates in all banks upward.
 
4. 	To discontinue the practice of tying specific
 
sources of funds to specific loans in favor of
 
restructuring interest rates and terms based on
 
the 	nation's social objectives.
 
5. 	To consider means other than interest rates for
 
providing housing subsidies.
 
6." 	To explore the feasibility of renegotiable mort­
gages or the possibility of formal indexation,
 
in order to reflect the cost of money to the
 
bank in its loan program.
 
The report and its recommendations are now being discussed
 
in Government. Although it is too early to anticipate the
 
final outcome, initial reaction appears to agree that there
 
is a problem in housing finance. However, the willingness to
 
.address the major issues of sources of financing, interest
 
rates and levels of subsidy is yet to be seen.
 
15/ Pratt, Richard T. and Associates. Housing F-inance 
in the Korean Economy. Draft report prepared for.USAID,,
January 14, 1977.
 
-47­
-C. AID'S FUTURE WORK ON HOUSING
 
POLICY ISSUES
 
Several major studies are currently underway as a result
 
of AID assistance, including the following:
 
1. 	A large-scale study of housing preference and
 
demand, involving 10,000 interviews by KNHC.
 
The study design is now under preparation.
 
2. 	A study of the housing construction industry.
 
3. 	Surveys of squatters in areas to be considered
 
for upgrading. The study design is now being
 
prepared.
 
4. 	 A survey of the occupants of AID apartments is 
currently underway. 
Also undertaken recently with AID's assistance was a
 
report on KNHC operations. 16/ This has just been completed

and his not yet been presenE-ed to Government.
 
16/ National Savings and Loan League. Korean National
 
Housing Corporation 489-HG-001; 003 and 005 Fiscal and Manage­
ment Review and Project 489-HG-004, Korea City of Seoul Fiscal
 
and Manacement Review. Paper prepared for USAID, January 3,
 
1977.
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Chapter V
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE'HOUSING POLI'CY'DIALOGUE 
.
 
In the Introduction to this report, the basic theme of
this case study was stated as a story of the interaction, over
 a prolonged period of time (1971 to 1977), 
between a sovereign
government and a major international assistance agency. This
interaction was focused on a single, but complicated, sector:
housing. This chapter summarizes the activities by focusing

on the major "events" in housing policy development during

the seven-year period. Objectives of the parties changed
during the period. They started out reasonably close together
in their objectives and then experienced a widening gap as
AID's objectives began to coalesce around specific programming
for low-income groups. This was followed by a period of nego­tiation and adjustment by the Korean Government and AID during

which there developed a set ofemutually acceptable objectives.

This process is continuing.
 
A. SOME OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
 
The facts on this dialogue have been stated and the
 
successes and shortfalls noted in this chapter. 
There is no
doubt that AID has played a major, though indirect, role in

shaping Korean Housing Policy and in influencing housing pro­grams during this period. In the process, AID has seen distinct
 
movement toward its own objectives in many areas. There have
been particular changes in obtaining for lower-income groups

a larger proportion of the public sector investment as well
 as in adopting a more realistic set of policy decisions for
their ultimate benefit. AID has been influencial in building
the institutional capacity of the KNHC as well as, to 
a lesser
though not insignificant extent, the capacity of MOC's Housing
Bureau. AID has assisted in institutionalizing the housing

policy proceds in building an adequate data base for

rational decision-making. 
The specific achievements with

regard to capital loans is discussed in the next chapter.
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There have also been substantial shortfalls in what AID
 
had hoped to accomplish. By far, the largest has been the
 
failure to effect the housing finance system in Korea to date,
 
even though this issue is far from closed. The other concern
 
is a matter of the degree of success achieved. Could progress
 
have been faster in lowering the cost of housing for low-income
 
groups? developing a working housinq policy? initiating a
 
large-scale Home Improvement Program? etc.? These questions
 
can only be answered subjectively.
 
Their answers hinge on an individual's perception of the
 
degree to which an international assistance agency should seek
 
*leverage" through a possible denial of capital sought by a
 
country. As stated in the Introduction, an underlying assump­
tion of international cooperation is that the assistance-giving
 
agency has the right to define its own objectives; conversely,
 
the country has the obligation to dermine its polices and
 
plans. Hence, the need for negotiation and F promise arises.
 
In Korea, the circumstances of timing permitted AID to
 
proceed in implementing its own objectives without threats
 
of terminating future loan commitments to Government, because
 
the initial loan was essentially for upper-middle-income apart­
ments. Therefore, changes required by AID came after the
 
program *as underway and after rapport and confidence had built
 
up on both sides. This sequence would not have been possible
 
under the objectives and policy guidelines which influence
 
the HIG Program today.
 
Thailand is a good example of the contrast. Thailand,
 
in 1976/77, essentially holds the same policy positions as
 
Korea in 1971/72. AID has spent considerable time and money
 
in discussing a possible HIG Program with Thailand, but no
 
substantial progress has been made toward a specific loan.
 
The main reason for this standstill is that the kinds of
 
housing projects which the Thais are eager to support do not
 
fit AID's objectives and policies. It is too early to know
 
the ultimate outcome, but the question must be raised that if
 
AID could enter the country with an initial loan outside its
 
guidelines, (as it did in the Banpo Apartment Project in
 
Korea), would there be a greater chance of influencing housing
 
objectives and programs of Thailand eventuallv. In other words,
 
if the initial gap on objectives is too wide for immediate
 
compromise on AID's terms, does the situation create the
 
potential for totally losing an opportunity to ultimately
 
benefit the lwoer-income groups of concern. The World Bank
 
experience in Korea, discussed in Appendix I and the Intro­
duction, raises the same issue.
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There is little doubt that AID could have increased its
 
influence in Korea, and probably accelerated the rate of
 
housing policy change, had it prepared a more precise strategy

of the changes it sought and had it formulated operational

porposals for their implementation. This point is taken up
 
more fully in Part Three, Lessons for the Future. The failure
 
to do this was partly because the AID HIG Program itself
 
underwent enormous policy changes during 1973 and 1974. It
 
hits only been under the present leadership of the Office of
 
Housing that specific developmental objectives have been
 
articulated which would permit preparation of a total country
 
strategy for a HIG Program, instead of a mere series of

on-off" loanprojects.
 
B. SOME THOUGHTS ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
 
Another question to be considered is whether AID could
 
,have achieved an even more successful realization of its
 
objectives by using more technical assistance.
 
AID has used technical assistance throughout the Korean
 
program, primarily through a series of short missions of one
 
week to a month's duration. AID did not open its~regional

office until mid-1975 and did not staff that office with a
 
technical-assistance specialist (an atchitect/planner of
 
excellent competence) until mid-1976. Since establishment of
 
the permanent office in Korea (even though it has Asian-wide
 
responsibilities), there has been a definite improvement in the
 
rate of policy change and in specific project accomplishments,

particularly in the Home Improvement Proqram.
 
Overall, AID's point of view on technical assistance has
 
been to provide such assistance as has been requested and also
 
to promote assistance on certain issues such as housing finance
 
even when not requested. On the other hand, AID has always

attempted to make sure that the basic responsibility for work
 
on housing policy and related issues has rested with Korean
 
professionals. This is the correct position because it has
 
forced needed dialogue on the objectives to take place among

Korean agencies and has avoided the kind of purely academic
 
reports which frequently result when foreign experts are essen­
tially responsible. Therefore, AID's short-term technical
 
assistance strategy was probably essentially correct. Certainly,
 
now that there is a permanent presence in Korea to anchor the
 
short-term assistance and conduct essential follow-up, this
 
should be a workable model.
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It is, perhaps, presumptous for PADCO to comment on the
 
quality of technical assistance given in Korea, considering
 
the fact that the firm was a significant part of that effort.
 
Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that the technical quality
 
of the PADCO's work and the work of several other groups and
 
individuals involved over the years has been of acceptable
 
standard. The question is how this technical assistance
 
effort could have been more effective.
 
a 
First, there have been numerous individual experts in­
volved, many for only one or two visits. It probably would
 
be better in principle to limit as far as possible the number
 
of individuals, because to be relevant an individual needs
 
to build rapport with the host country professionals and to
 
gain an overall understanding of the housing s .;uation in a par­
ticular country. This takes several visits to accomplish.
 
Second, the technical assistance effort should be more
 
precisely planned in advance with host country agencies. The
 
more precise the scope of work, and the more prepared the host
 
country professionals are to work with the individual expert

during his short mission, the more can be accomplished. Equally
 
important is that the total schedule of technical assistance
 
should be worked out, if several missions are involved, and
 
agreed to with the host country. This has the advantage of
 
forcing the Koreans, in this case, to develop their own precise
 
work schedule to meet levels of accomplishment prior to a visit
 
from a foreign expert. It also allows the individual expert
 
to plan his schedule in advance, so that he can be available
 
at the time his input is required.
 
Third, AID should insist on "plugging in" the technical
 
assistance input at the appropriate level of government. In
 
Korea, as in most developinq countries, policy decisions are
 
only taken at the highest levels of government, even on rela­
tively minor issues. The gap between the technical staff and
 
policymaking officials is very wide and formally structured.
 
The prudent use of a foreign expert can bridge this gap, if
 
the assistance-giving agency works out appropriate arrangements
 
in advance. Too much of the technical assistance provided in
 
Korea was focused at lower levels of the bureacracy, far below
 
the real decision levels.
 
Fourth, whereas the basic strategy on the use of technical
 
assistance as a catalyst was correct, particularly in that the
 
Korean professionals are generally competent, there is a prob­
lem in insuring operational proposals. There is a subtle
 
tradeoff between keeping the responsibility firmly placed with
 
the host country and obtaining a high quality of operational,
 
implementable recommendations. Many of the issues to be
 
addressed require solutions which are new to Korea and clearly
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beyond the experience of local professionals. A stronger

component of technical assistance might be productively used
 
to assist in developing the specifics for action after the
 
Government has itself developed the policy position.
 
C. SOME THOUGHTS ON TRAINING
 
There was only one formal effort to support training

throughout the Korean program. It consisted of providing 10 
weeks of training in 1975 for four Koreans in the offices of 
PADCO, including selected visits to housing agencies in Phila­
delphia and Boston. The purpose of the session was to instruct 
perscnnel of the unit to be involved with ongoing development

of the housing policy. In fact, the Koreans nominated by

government did not eventually remain in the housing policy

unit and, because of language problems and the newness of the
 
activity to PADCO, the results can be considered only marginally

successful.
 
Could training have played a more important role in the
 
program? It is probable that a more extensive training pro­
gram would not have significantly influenced any of the policy

issues or the construction of the apartment component of HIG
 
loans. It is likely that a specific training program or ear­
lier placement of the long-term, technical-assistance expert

for the Home Improvement Program would have resulted in
 
a more rapid development of that particular component. Cer­
tainly, training was not necessary for personnel of the KNHC.
 
An argument could be made for training technical staff
 
of Seoul City and MOC, on the basis that the analytical, policy

and program issues with which they were dealing represented

considerable departures from their previous experience. A
 
well-developed training program might, therefore, have been
 
useful in preparing staff in technical work upon which key

decisions were to eventually be based. In addition, a train­
ing program (of the kind intended for the housing policy unit),

would have been valuable to prepare staff for ongoing

responsibilities under the emerging housing policy framework.
 
There are probably some useful opportunities for the HIG
 
Program to develop a greater emphasis on training, by linking
 
more closely to the regular training programs of AID. This
 
is particularly important, given the decision of AID to rely

mainly on short-term technical-assistance missions rather
 
than on larger, 2ong-term specialist assignments in develop­
ing the HIG Program and in influencing the related housing

policmy issues.
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'PART, TWO E 
THE HIG LOAN, PROJECTS 
Chapter VI
 
THE KOREAN PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM CONTEXT
 
During the period of AID's involvement in Korean housing
(since 1971), there have been five HIG loans. Four loans
 
were for apartments sponsored by KNHC and one loan was to

Seoul City for upgrading. Table 13 summarizes the salient
 
points for each loan.
 
TABLE 13
 
AID Housing Achievements in Korea
 
Year Number 
Percent 
KNHC 
Percent 
Public 
Percent 
Total 
1973 
1974 
1,490 
3,700 
28.7 
36.5 
8.5 
12.3 
.Q 
2.3 
1975 9,200 49.7 14.6 5.1 
1976 4,710 18.1 8.1 2.6 
Total 19,100 30.7 11.2 2.5 
SOURCE: PADCO estimates.
 
The previous chapter summarized the interaction between
 
AID and the Korean Government on housing policy issues. In a
 
sense, it was the individual HIG loans which provided leverage

and stimulated dialogue on the housing policy issues. 
 That
 discussion forms the background to the specific projects under­
taken with HIG loans which, in turn, had their own set of
 
specific operational objectives to be achieved.
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Ir LI
 
Figures 12 and 13. AID-financed apartments: 13- and 
15-pyong units., 
-56­
Figure 14. AID-financed apartments
in Seoul: 10-pyong unit&
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Figure 15. AID-financed apartments:
 
Improved design and public facilities.
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A. KNHC AND PUBLIC SECTOR HOUSING PROGRAMS
 
The role of the public sector in Korean housing is con­
siderable. 
It involves programs for land development, ly/public housing construction and public finance. 
The total
number of units, either constructed directly in or financed
by the public sector, in 1974 was 45,500 (about 28 percent

of all housing construction). (See Table 14)
 
Public housing construction is jointly the responsibility

of the cities, KNHC and other agencies of the Government. The
types of units include rural duplex units, independent houses

and apartments for either sale or lease. 
The most visible
component has been five-story walkup apartments which have
been constructed in Seoul, Pusan and the major provincial
cities. Experimental rowhouse units have been constructed

and are expected to be included in the 1977 program.
 
During the First Plan Period (1962-1966), the public
housing program was limited to about 10 percent of the total
housing units constructed, primarily because of a lack of
 
/Large-scale land development at present is largely
the responsibility of the cities. 
They either develop land
directly or, particularly in the smaller cities, facilitate
land development by the private sector. 
 In either case, a
 process called land readjustment is the most common mechanism.
In this process, the developer notifies private landowners of
its intent to develop an area. A readjustment plan is then
prepared, in which the developer identifies parcels needed for
public purposes and for sale, in order to recoup development
costs. The remainder is then returned to the original land­owners, in proprotion to their original ownership. If proper­ly planned and carried out, the increase in land values is
sufficient to recover construction costs and to return land
to the original owner with a value in'excess of that of his
6riginal land.
 
Land readjustment has been practiced in Korea since 1937,
with most of the activity in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
 Through
1974, a total of 67,410,000 pyongshad been developed for hous­ing sites sufficient to house as many as 10 to 15 million per­sons if used efficiently. Thus, the mechanism appears to work
well. It could be administered in such a way as to provide

an increased supply of lots for the low-income groups.
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TABLE 14 
Korean Public Housing 
Achievements 1/ 
Public 	 KNHC
 
Year Total Number Percent Number Percent of Pub c 
1962 49,492 8,776 	 1.558 
1963 58,507 6,232 	 907
 
1964 54,150 4,820 1,026 
/1965 70,465 7,953 580 
- 1966 93,321 12,134 1,062 
1962-66 325,935 33,915 10.41 5,133 1.57 15.13
 
1967 94,568 5,727 1,407
 
1968 96,225 20,094 811
 
1969 104,545 37,812 1,239
 
1970 115,000 15,579 2,423
 
,1971 130,000 23,808 1,845
 
1967-71 540,338 103,026 19.07 7,725 1.43 7.50
 
1972 110,000 2/ 17,500 2/ 2,290 
1973 142,660 7/ 43,400 T/ 5,190 
,1974 160,000 7/ 45,500 7/ 10,152 
1975 180,000 1/ 63,000 7/ 18,498 
- 1976 180,000 58,000 26,076 
1972-76 772,660 170,400 22.05 62,206 8.05 36.51
 
1977 220,000 95,000
 
1978 240,000 94,000
 
1979 260,000 100,000
 
1980 290,000 108,000
 
1981, 320,000 4/ 115,000 4/
 
1977-01 1,330,000 .l2,00 38.50 	 -
SOURCES: 	I/ Zncludes housing constructed by the Goveirnent and public,
 
aqencies plus housing financed by the Korean Housing Bank.
 
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Construction. Status of Housing
 
(bound but undated report).
 
2/ Estimates from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Construction. 
Zoreas Housing Policy and Lone-Term Construction Plan, p. 53. M1OC,May 1'375. 
3/ Current estimates from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Construction 
Fourth Housina Construction Plan, p. 13, MOC, October 1976. 
/ ource o, t976-1.981 i.gureu: Fourth Housing Construction Plan, 
p. 13.
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financial resources. In 1968, the second year of the Second

Plan, the Public Housing Program was greatly enlarged, by

implementing a "citizens' apartments" program, This program
 
was financed out of general funds and administered by the
 
city governments under the Ministry of Home Affairs. During

the entire period of the Second Plan, public housing con­
struction amounted to 19 percent of all units built.
 
In 1972, following a collapse of one of the "citizens'
 
apartment" units and evidence of structural faults in other
 
units, the principal responsibility for public housinq con­
struction was transferred from LNHC to the Ministry of Construc­
tion. The total public sector program was expanded to 22 per­
cent of the total units constructed. During this time, the
 
sources of public housing finance also underwent transformation,

with increasing reliance upon national housing bonds and a
 
lottery administered by KHB as a source of funds and less
 
reliance upon general revenues.
 
B. THE 1976 HOUSING PROGRAM
 
There are at present a number of housing programs directed
 
at" Iifferent.situations and methods of'implementation within

KIrea. The 1976 public housing program is presented in Table
 
15.
 
Thus,.the total government program was planned for 74,500

units in 1976 with approximately 40 percent of the total expecte
to be built in that year. Within the public sector total, KNHC
 
was expected to construct 26,000 units, primarily apartments,

while a substantial number of apartments.and other types of
 
housing were assigned to the cities, local autonomous bodies
 
And other agencies.
 
The costs of publicly-constructed housing range, in 1976
 
prices, from W 210,000 per pyong for 13-pyong lease apartments
in urban areas to W 70,000 per pyong for 15-pyong units. Based
 
the income and affordability analysis presented earlier, it
is apparent that the present program does reach all but the
 
lowest income groups. But, it must be kept in mind that it
 
is not implemented on a sufficient scale to reach even the
 
majority of those needing and requiring housing.
 
Within the total Public Housing Program, the programs of'

KNHC are of particular interest, since most of AID's housing

finance to date has been associated with KNHC projects. The
 
programs of KNHC have developed in three distinct phases: 1)

1962 to 1967, during which time the activities of the corporatio
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TABLE i5­
1976 Korean Public 'HousingProgram
 
,,Number 	 Program 
10,000 	 13-pyong apartments for lease administered'
 
by KNHC and the cities
 
26,000 	 12 to 25-pyong apartments for sale admin­
istered by KNHC
 
3,500 	 Other apartments administered by sponsoring
 
government ministries.
 
3,200 	 12 to 25-pyong, single-story, duplex houses
 
administered by local autonomous bcdies and
 
sponsoring government agencies.
 
'
19,100	 18-pyong independent houses administered by
 
KHB, Seoul City and local autonomous bodies.
 
8,200 	 15 to 18-pyong rural houses administered by
 
the local autonomous bodies and other
 
government ministries.
 
3,500 	 12 to 25-pyong houses for resettlement of
 
former residents of industrial estates.
 
r 9-pyong apartments for resettlement of former
1,000 

residents of houses removed in the cities,
 
administered by the cities and,local autono­
mous bodies.
 
74,500-

SOURCE: 	Ministry of Construction. -1976 National'Housing
 
Construction Plan and Guiding Principles for Fund
 
Management.- (TypedEnglish translation)
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were approximately equally distributed between the construc­
tion of single and row houses, apartments, and site develop­
ment; 2) from 1968 to 1971, during which time single and row
 
house construction was curtailed while the land development
 
programs were expanded greatly; and 3) from 1972 to present,
 
when its activities have been restricted with few exceptions
 
to apartment construction which has been expanded. It is
 
expected that the KNHC will construct row houses in the second­
ary cities during the Fourth Plan period, in an effort to
 
reduce costs. It will also serve as the agency responsible
 
for the AID-financed Home Improvement Program in the secondary

cities, although much of the actual implementation will be
 
delegated to the cities wherever possible.
 
C. THE AID AND KNHC HOUSING PROGRAM
 
The overall KNHC program is described in Tables 16 and
 
17. The total number of units constructed ranged from 1,.845
 
in 1971 to 26,076 in 1976. All of these units were apartments.

The sizes have ranged from 7.5 to 22 pyongs, although some
 
single 32-pyong houses were built for special purpo3es. The
 
selling prices have ranged from W 1,270,000 for 13-pyong units
 
built in 1971 to W 5,550-,000 -for the largest single house
 
units. 
Overall, &NHC has focused on low-income units and has
 
built high-income units for special purposes, to demonstrate
 
new concepts, or to gain capital necessary to finance low­
income units. Within the total KNHC Program, AID has played
 
a significant role: AID financed units amounting to 29 percent
 
of the total in 1973 which increased to 39 percent before
 
dropping slightly to 19 percent in 1976. (See Chart 1)
 
Furthermore, AID funding subsequent to the initial loan has been
 
focused on smaller units to impact the urban poor.
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TABLEZ 16
 
iiHC Housing Constzuction y Type
 
(inthousand won)
 
Housing Built By 
Private Fund or AID Guaranty 
National Housing Loan Apartywnt 
Year 
Type 
(Pyonq) 
Number 
of Units 
Rental Aartments 
NImO: 54AlKlng 
of Units Price 
Number 
of Units 
,, 
Selling 
Price 
1 
Number 
of Units 
Selling 
Price 
Average 
Selling 
Price 
1971 13 
22 
300 
748 
300 1,270 
748 3,190 
1,270 
3.190 
(Heating) 
1972 13 
1s 
200 
109 
200 
109 
1,220 
1,875 
% 1,220 
1,875 
-. 
(Single -
Detached 
House) 
1973 13 
22 
1,500 
1,490,,, 22 
1.500 
1490 
1.,360 
* 1H490(Heating) 3,600 
1,360 
3,600 
.,32 420 420 (Heating) 
5,525 i5,525 
1974' 13 
'15. 
4,00 
2,700 
' 3,600 2,130 1,000 
2.700 
(Heating) 
2;200 
3,400 
2,145 
3,400 
32 So0 580 5,550 ' 5;550 (Heating) 
1975 13 
15 
17 
12,200 
3,130 
2,410 
6,000 2,420 
2,410 
-
3,400 
-6.200 
3,130 
2,430 
2,850 
,2;425 
'2,850 
3,400 
Housing built by private fund is the housing from 1971 to 1974 and national housing is the1OT3M 
housing since 1975. 
SQURCs 	Pratt, Richard T. and Associates. 1lousing Finance in tho Koroan Econony. from 4at& 
furnished by IQIHC. 
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TABLE, 17. 
. AID RIG Program 
in Korea 
Loan
 
HG Value Unit Size 
 'Cost Per Number of# Date (Dollars) (Pyongs) .Uit (won) Units 
001'' April 1973 10,000,000 22 4,320,000 .,4g0
 
002 April 1974 20,000,000 
 3,700
 
13 2,200,000 1,000
 
15 3,400,000 2,700
 
003 April 1975 25,000,000 
 9,200
6,200
13 2,488,000 

15 2,666,400 3,000
 
004 July 1976 10,00 0,000 Squatter upgrading in Seoul 
005 July 1976 15,0000,000 
 4,710

.7.SA !,963,0Q0 500
 
10B 2,314,000 600
 
10C 2,508,000 
 600
13D 2,748,000 1,000
 
10E 2,572,000 240
 
13F- 2,706,000- 1,770
 
2,943,000
 
006 Unsigned 10,000,000 Squatter upgrading
 
in other cities
 
All 
 90,000,000 
 19,100
 
NOTE: HG 004 was implemented by Seoul City. 
All other. proj­
ects were executed by the Korean Housing Corporation. 
SOURCE: PADCO, based upon data furnished by USAID. 
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annI ?aual sudqeu for,'Hou1±nqConstuuiofl 
so;ooo 
_ I unda 
A HP ruds 	 74,000 
70,000
 
60,000
 
50,400
 
-
SO0,000 

40,000 . 
31,200
 
30,000
 
20.000. 
13,250 1 n 
* 	 12,200
 
.ilIon ',an - 1 
1976
1973 1974 1975 

Source of WHC b.daet data: 	 Torea National Houtina Cor-oration. Arochurs 
tntitled "Korea., ational Housinq Cor'rat..on." 
KOOIC, October 1976. 
Chapter VII
 
CONCLUSIONS ON THE HIG
 
APARTMENT PROJECTS
 
The HIG-financed apartment projects have resulted,!
 
in construction of 19,000 units to the benefit of over 1,. -,
 
100,000 people. The following pages summarize the major con­
clusions concerning this effort.
 
A. CONFORMANCE WITH
 
IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENTS
 
KNHC has implemented the apartment loans efficiently with­
in-the estimated cost figures and has fully complied with the 
implementation agreements., 
B. TARGET GROUPS REACHED'
 
One of the outstanding achievements of the HIG Program
 
in Korea is that it has moved from a project benefitting pri­
marily upper-middle-Lncome groups (the 65th percentile or
 
above) to a program which benefits groups in the low-income
 
range (possibly as low as the 10th or 15th percentiles). The
 
overall progress of levels of income for the target groups of
 
Korean HIG Programs is shown in Chart 2 and outlined in Table
 
18.
 
C. COSTS
 
Cost reductions, while maintaining adequate quality, have
 
been an objective of the program from the beginning. This has
 
been achieved through careful engineering and architectural
 
design and efficient implementation. The prices of the various
 
types of units, corrected to 1975 prices, are shown in
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MUIAM 2 
Income revel of A=/HG Aarment Occupants 
1973-L976 1/ 
(Cu-rent Prices)
 
e4oie~ilv Zncocse, 
t1 ani (USS) 
120'(0 
(2503s
m.,an) 	 22 15.- L5P 
00,000 
(50)
 
1972 1973 1974 1975 16 
VO1Zi 	 Y Xncom a: year end. 
SMICI 	 Zncom eetmeates are from the Economic Vlanninq Bord, ftreau of Statistics. 
Annual Re2or: on t1he .Faily Income and £xenditure Survey. 1972, 1975 and 1976. 
Tha i.ncom range ~or "he HG 002 Pro3ect case from a user w yrvey.Ocher figures 
axe ecimates based an the costs and terms of financing. for a further 
deecription see. U.S. Agency for znternational De elopment. Coea MouIzna 
Guaranty Paper 1975, Annex XV and 7roject Pnaer 1976, Annex V. 
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TABLE 18 
AID HIG Projects Versus
 
Income Level of Occupants
 
(in won)
 
Expected 	Income
 
Type Monthly Payment of Occupants
 
Year (pyong) During Grace Period High Low
 
1973 	 22 14,856 99,040 59,424
 
1974 	 13 11,280 76,000 38,000
 
15 17,440 96,000 58,000,
 
1975 13 20,633 1/ 82,532 47,161
 
, 15 23,787 1/ 95,148 54,370
 
1976 7.5 
 16,091 2/ 64,364 36,779
 
10.0 	 14,069 to 19,834_/ 79,160 45,234
 
13 15,449 to 22,527 _/ 81,889 46,793
 
NOTES: 	 I/ 50 percent AID-financed loan with 20 percent
supplementary short-term loan in cities outside 
of Seoul, expected to result in increase.4 pay­
ments as a percentage of income during initial 
repayment period. 2/ 50 percent AID-finaniced
 
loan -- amount of monthly payment during grace 
period calculated as if there were a 20 per­
cent supplementary loan. 3/ 50 percent AID­
financed loan in Seoul, 70-percent AID-financed 
loan in other cities. Percentage payments out
 
of income same as in other time periods, related
 
to type of loan. 
'SoU RCE: 	 PADCO analysis. 
Tables 19 and 20. These show that there is a gradual decrease
 
in per-pyong costs as the units increase in size from 7.5 pyongs
 
to 15 pyongs; that the costs in Seoul are cheaper than in the
 
secondary cities; and that the costs of a central heating sys­
tem may raise total apartment costs by 15 percent.
 
Since 13-pyong, centrally-heated units have been built
 
each year since 1974 in Seoul, it is possible to compare the
 
costs of these to price and income levels. Table 20 phows
 
that the costs have increased roughly 25 percent since 1974
 
while the GNP price index has increased by 43 percent and
 
GNP per capia has increased by 55 percent. Thus, the costs
 
of the units have been held below the general level of price

increases and below presumed per capita income Increases, in
 
spite of rapid increases in the prices of building interests.
 
D. FEASIBILITY OF
 
CONDOMINIUM APARTMENTS
 
One of the objectives of the ROKG has been to demonstrate
 
to the private sector that condominium apartments could be con­
structed economically and sold in competition with single-unit
 
houses and other traditional forms of housing in Korea. This
 
objective for Seoul and the secondary cities (and for different
 
income levels) appears to have been achieved throughout the
 
country. The result has been private sector construction of
 
apartments in Seoul whereas previously there had been little
 
construction of this type. 
E. CONDOMINIUM MANAGEMENT 
It is evident, from the external appearance of the
 
buildings, that the condominium system of ownership and main­
tenance of buildings developed for AID-financed apartments
 
has been functioning well.
 
F. DESIGN
 
Clearly, AID involvement has influenced the economics
 
of design, but the extent to which it has influenced physical
 
aspects is not known. All of the projects appear to function
 
well as physical spaces, although the overall appearance
 
to Western eyes is often strongly regimented and not always
 
sensitve to the topography.
 
-70­
TABLE 19
 
-Cost oa-tAD-Financed-Apartments -­
(in won)
 
Cost Per Pyong Cost Per Pyong floating Price 
Project, (Current Prices) (1975 Prices) Year- -Type Number Built Nhere system Index 
JIG 001- 163,636 257,209 1973 12 1490 Seoul 	 Central .636
 
iIG 002 -169-231 210,010 1974 13 1000 Seoul Central .806
 
226,667 281,285 1974 15 2700 Others -Central .806
 
JIG 003 191,385 191,385 1975 13 6200 Seoul 	 Central 1.00
 
Central 1.00

-191,093 191,193 1975 15 3000 Others 

JIG 005 261,733 227,589 1976 7.5 500 Seoul Central 1.150
 
231.400 201,213 1976 .10 600 Seoul Ondol 1.150
 
250,800 218,082 1976 10 600 Seoul Central 1.150
 
211,385 183,809 1976 13 1000 Seoul Central 1.150
 
257,200 223,648 1976 10 240 Other Ondol 1.150
 
208.153 188,923 1976 13 1770 Other Ondol 1.150
 
226,385
 
SOUiKCESs 	 Implementation Agreements. Also, Richard T. Pratt and Associates. Hlousing L'niIi- in 
the Korean Economy. 
TABLE 20
 
Cost 13-Pyong Apartment,. SeoU
 
(at current prices} 
-
1973 1974" 1975 1976-" 
Cost Per Pyong/For 13-Pyong
 
Unit With Central Ileating -9
 
1692307- 191384.61 211,314.61
System 
1.00 1.131 1.249
 Index 

219.9 252.89
139.9 177.2
Price Doltator 

. 1.00 -1.241 1.427
Index> ... . .. 

202,593 261,835 -313,000
GNP Per CapLtial 149,777 

1.00 -1.292 1.545
 Index 

SOURCEs Richard T. Pratt and Associates. Housing Finance in the Korean Economy.
 
G. SITE SELECTION'
 
Site selection of KNHC;projects shows them to be well
 
located. Assistance is being providud at present in market.

analysis and site selection by AID advisers.
 
H. •ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
 
ASPECTS OF PROJECT PREPARATION
 
-,Tosome extent, repetition of similar projects by KNHC
 
ensures that economic and financial aspects will be kept within
 
known bounds. The overall quality appears to be quite Iligh.
AID assistance may have resulted in increased consciousness
 
of the costs of projects and of their economic and financial 
aspects, as evidenced in present KNHC studies and project prep­
aration procedures.
 
I. MAINTENANCE OF
 
VALUE MECHANISMS
 
The original 1971 AID Pre-Investment Survey contained a
 
variable mortgage system, with mortgage values and payments

periodically readjusted in accordance with a specified index
 
and the entire burden borne by the purchaser. Subsequently,
 
a system was developed in which the purchaser bears the burden
 
up to a specified level, after which the government assumes
 
the rest. The present system appears to work satisfactorily,
 
.although it does generate a liability for the government. An
 
option proposed in the recent Pratt report is for mortgages

which are renegotiable at periodic intervals. Whether or not
 
this would be preferable to the present system remains to be
 
evaluated.
 
J. REPAYMENT MECHANISMS 
The present terms of finance in AID apartments are gen­
erally for 50 to 70 percent down payment with a 10-year grace

period and a 25-year repayment period. Interest rates are of
 
the order of 9.0 to 10.0 percent. This is a lower down pay­
ment, longer repayment period and slightly higher interest
 
rate than for most subsidized Korean national housing fund
 
loans. In terms of market acceptance and ease of administra­
tion, the system appears to work well. The grace period is,

essentially, in lieu of regularly increasing payments. Such
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increase might be more effective'on'paper but would be more
 
difficult to understand and administer.
 
K. MONITORING 
One of the potentially more useful innovations achieved
 
as a direct result of AID's involvement in Korean housing

has been the introduction of user surveys. One of thise
 
(for the 1974 project) has been accomplished and a larger­
scale survey is currently underway. The results can feed
 
back directl:- into design or into overall program management,

in numerous ways. KNHC has hired staff and created a unit
 
specifically for such work, which holds promise of a contin­
uous survey and monitoring process.
 
L. SUBSIDY
 
Although the AID-sponsored projects are sold at prices

which fully reflect costs to KNEC (including costs of capital

and land), the present relending rates of 9.0 to 10.0 per­
cent are a substantial subsidy in terms of Korean capital

market rates. These often go as high as 20 to 25 percent or
 
higher. The net effect is that the buyer receives a 40 to
 
50 percent subsidy on the loan amount. This means that
 
resales of mortgages, dewspite administrative restrictions,
 
are likely to be frequent and that the subsequent purchaser

is likely to have a higher income than would be deduced from
 
an analysis of payments versus income levels.
 
M. REPLICABILITY
 
If there were sufficient international capital avail­
able to enable the financing of all housing in Korea at such
 
rates, the implicit interest rate subsidy would mean only

higher consumption of housing. This could be justified on
 
social grounds. Since such funding is not available, however,

it means only that those who are fortunate enough to be selected
 
for an AID- or government-financed housing unit are much better
 
off than those who are not. Others must continue to finance
 
their housing out of savings, off the "curb market," by

incremental building or by repetitive moves. The present

housing finance system is not replicable, and AID is actually

encouraging higher interest rates for mortgages throughout

the housing finance system. This, in turn, would require
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further reductions in house size in order to reach 'the same
 target groups currently reached.
 
N. STAFFING AND
 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
 
AID's HIG Program in Korea has resulted in substantial
 
improvements in the staffing of KNHC. Its staff is clearly
capable of more than adequate engineering design, project
preparation and management. Furthermore, it is developing
social survey and research skills. It has a capable finan­
cial management office, as exemplified by the current low 
rate of defaults in housing loans. The overall atmosphere
is one of initiative and confidence -- the signs of a good
organization in any situation.
 

Chapter VIII 
THE SPECIFIC PROJECTS FINANCED
 
The following pages summarize each of the four HIG loans
used to finance apartment development in various forms (see
Table 21.) A statistical summary'of each project is found in
 
Appendix I. All of the projects were executed by KNHC.
 
A. HG 001 (1973) BANPO APARTMENTS
 
HG 001 was intended, under the AID Office of Housing
 
Policy of 1973, as an upper-middle-income housing project.

It was conceived in accordance with objectives of the Korean.
 
Government and was intended to yield a high rate of economic 
return. The loan amount was US$ 10 million which was to 
finance 1,490 22-pyong apartments. The objectives of the 
project were as follows.
 
1. 	To demonstrate the feasibility of reasonably
 
priced standardized apartments under optimum
 
land usage.
 
2. 	To demonstrate long-term financing of housing

under reasonable terms.
 
3. 	 To generate ROKG interest in the viability 
of an expanded housing program and in the 
long-range institutional goals and objectives
enumerated in the Pre-Investment Survey. 18/ 
18/ 	U.S. Government, Agency for International Development.
 
Housi'n Guaranty Paper: Korea 001, 1972. pp. i, ii, 2, 3r, 8. 
TADB.E 21 
of AID BIlG Loans in Korea 
Title Date 
Amount of 
Loan 
(US$) 
-lumberof 
Units 
Likely 
Income Level 
(Percentile) 
Mortgage 
(Percent) 
Sales 
Price 
(won) 
Down 
Payments 
(won) 
Down 
Payments 
(won) 
-I 
03 
JIG 001 
JiG 002 
IG 003 
March 
1973 
April 
1974 
July,' 
1975. 
10 million 
20 million, 
1 
25,000-
1,490 
3,700 
9,200 
65 or above 
25 or above 
25 or above 
75 
70 
50 1/ 
-
3,600,000 
22000 
2,200,000-
3,400,000 
2,488,000-
2,866,000 
915,600 
500-5,5 
653,000-
1,010,000 
1,2440000-
1,433,200 
14,856 
15,350 
23,715 
9.833 
23,787 
IG 004 July-
1976 
15million, 
--
4,710 10 to 45 50 2/ 1,963.000-
2,943,000 
981,500-
1,471,500 
7.670 
16.099 
IG 005 
HOTES: 
July 10 million 4,000 * 10 to 60 90 3/ 
1976 -
I/ Plus-20 percent suppleantary in gecondary cities. 
Tn secondary cLties. 3/ Of land purchase price. 
varies varies 
2/ 50 percent in Seoul 
varies 
70 percent 
-SOU 'R: PA6CO analysis; 
- Several innovative features were introduced in the project,
including a variable payment mortgage schedule, a maintenance­of value mechanism to protect the Government and AID against

'possible devaluation of the won, and anti-speculation measures.
 
Apartments were to be under condominium ownership in which
a regulatory agreement governing buildings on each site was to
include provision for home owner's use and joint ownership of
their respective building facilities. Such condominium owner­ship was also to provide for use of utilities, streets, play­grounds, community structures and other facilities located on

each project site.
 
The maintenance-of-value mechanism adopted to protect the
lender against possible devaluation of the won consisted of

the following.
 
1. 	A 2.14 percent per annum charge as part of the
 
mortgage repayment.
 
2. 	A W 225,000 portion of each buyer's down
 
payment.
 
3. 	A deposit by the Government into an'escrow_

account to make up any remaining deficit.
 
The increasing mortgage repayment schedule was based upon
a fixed increase in the home owner's payments every six months.
The relative amount of the increase was 5.0 percent of payments
in.the first six-month period. 
This decreased thereafter, as
the 	amount of increase became smaller relative to the amount
of payment. 
The purpose was to reduce initial payments in
order to permit persons with incomes lower than required to
pay 	a fixed-payment mortgage. 
These persons expected their
incomes to increase in order to qualify for a loan. 
The 	objec­tive adopted in October 1973 for HG 001 was to serve the income
group of W 60,000 and over with the mortgage requiring 25 per­
cent of monthly incomes;l_9y
 
19/National Savings and Loan League. 
Fiscal and Manage­ment Reiew: Korea 001, 002, 003 and 005. 
 (Prepared under

contract to AID.) January 3, 1977. p. 23.
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The intended impact of the financial system can be under­
stood by comparing the terms adopted for HG 001 for the 22­
pyong apartments financed in 1973 with the terms of the 
15-pyong apartments financed in 1974. The larger apartments 
financed in 1973 actually had smaller down payments and smaller 
initial monthly payments, as a result of the variable payment 
system used. 
1. Relevance of Objectives
 
The objectives set for HG 001 were typical of the AID
 
policy of that time but would no longer be applicable. The
 
adoption of the variable mortgage payment system indicates
 
that there was some concern for income levels.,
 
2. Achievements
 
a. Execution and Occupation
 
The project was executed very quickly, and marketed with 
great success. It resulted in 8,300 applications for the 1,490
 
apartments available.
 
b. Population Groups 
No-end-user survey has been undertaken, but the applicant
 
screening procedures adopted required, as a general guideline,
 
that no more than 25 percent of an applicant's income be used
 
to repay the mortgage. Thus, the minimum monthly income 
required in 1973 was approximately W 59,000 (roughly the 75th 
percentile of the income distribution of that time).
 
c. Finance
 
The management report'submitted in January 1977 by the
 
National Savings and Loan League concludes 20/ that the
 
20/ National Savihgs and"L6an League , p. 26.
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variable payment mortgage system is well-suited to the present

economic situation of the actual Banpo apartment buyers.

A caution is included, however, that it is possible that prob­
lems could arise in the future, if the rate of income growth
 
slows. However, the decreasing percentage of increase should
 
provide some protection against this occurring. Despite its
 
Apparent success, the variable payment system was not adopted

by KNHC for subsequent projects. Instead, a system of an ini­
tial grace period followed by an amortization period has been
 
followed.
 
The maintenance-of-value mechanism adopted for HG 001 was
 
based upon ain expected rate of exchange of four percent per
 
year. There has occurred one devaluation since 1973, from
 
W 400 to W 480 to the dollar. The fund was found less than
 
adequate to compensate for the increases incurred to date.
 
The long-term finance made available for the Banpo apart­
ments occurred at roughly the same time as the build up of the
 
Korean National Housing Fund. AID contributed to a demonstra­
tion of the long-term mortgage finance concept as one of sev­
eral such projects. Although the terms of AID's HIG funds to
 
the buyer involve a higher interest rate than most National 
Housing Fund loans, they are substantially below the probable
 
rate that would balance the supply of capital with demand.
 
Thus, the AID loan helped demonstrate that higher interest
 
rates are feasible for buyers.
 
d. Market Feasibility
 
One of the impacts believed to be attributable to HG 001'
 
was a demonstration of the market feasibility of such apart­
ments, in order to encourage the private sector to enter the
 
field. Although this type of impact is difficult to assess
 
thoroughly, several private-sector projects similar in design
 
which were constructed after the Banpo apartments were observed
 
during the field survey phase of the case study. It appeared
 
that relatively little apartment construction had been under­
taken prior to 1973 by the private sector, while there are now
 
many projects under construction.
 
B. HG 002 (1974) CONSTRUCTION OF
 
APARTMENTS IN SIX CITIES
 
HG 002 was formulated in 1974 during a time of reassessing 
the'overall AID shelter sector policy. It constituted an 
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effort to reduce costs and reach lower-income groups while
 
building upon the goodwill and rapport achieved in HG 001.
 
The 	loan amount was US$ 20 million. It financed 3,700 13­
and 	.15-pyong apartments. The objectives of the project were
 
as follows.
 
1. 	To construct lower-cost, reasonably-priced

city apartments in six cities, in order to
 
sell houses to lower-income families and to
 
demonstrate viable systems of finance and
 
technology.
 
2. 	To support the preparation of a Korean National
 
Housing Policy and Construction Plan.
 
3. 	To channel research and planning efforts in
 
,,a manner consistent with AID's shelter sector
 
policy.
 
4. 	To make possible the institutional milieu 
through which ROKG shelter sector needs can 
be provided. 3j 
The 13-pyong units were ondol heated while the 15-pyong

units were centrally heated. This difference gave rise to
 
the large per-unit cost differential between the two.
 
KNHC's agreement to build smaller, lower-cost apartment

-units than originally contemplated 22/ in six cities 23/

represented a major change for KNHC"Zuring negotiatioRT with
 
'AID.
 
2 U.S. Government. Agency for International Develop­
ment. -Housing Guaranty Paper. Korea HG 002, p. 16. USAID,

March 4, 1974.
 
22/ XNHC originally proposed the same size apartments as

constf-cted in the initial guaranty project to sell for
 
US$ 9,000 under current costs.
 
23/ 	The preliminary application proposed construction only
in SeSu'l, Pusan and Taegu.
 
KNHC hesitated to build smaller units and to undertake con­
struction in a number of additional cities because of its con­
cern over marketability and possible delinquencies in repayment

of home owner mortgaqes. In smaller cities, such as Taejon,
 
Kwangju and Inchou, there is the additional market factor of
 
gaining acceptance of apartment buildings over single family
 
houses.
 
The mortgage loans for HG 002 were for 70 percent financing
 
with a 25-year repayment period. Instead of the variable­
mortgage system used in HG 001, the system adopted for HG 002
 
included a 10-year grace period during which only interest
 
was to be paid. After 10 years, the amortization period was
 
to begin. This has the effect of reducing the financial burden
 
during the time after purchase while increasing it later, when
 
the income of the household should be higher. It would accomplish
 
the same general objectives of the variable-payment system but
 
would not be as effective. A problem could be created for some
 
households when the amortization period begins as a result of
 
the magnitude of the increase.
 
Initially, it was expected that changes in liability
 
related to changes in the exchange rate of the won could be
 
passed on to the home owner as an increase in monthly payments.
 
However, protests were made against the actions taken shortly
 
after initial occupancy, when the won was devalued from W 400
 
to W 480 to the dollar. As a result, the initial grace period
 
of the mortgage was extended to 10 years and a new, shared
 
system was develnped for the maintenance system. The system
 
finally adopted provides for the home owner's mortgage to be
 
increased by 25 percent of the increased repayments caused by
 
devaluations of the won, up to a minimum of four percent per
 
year. All fluctuations in excess ot that are to be paid by

the Government. Thus, the relative amount passed on to the home
 
owner is less than it was in HG 001, and the amount for which
 
the Government is liable is greater.
 
1. Relevance of Objectives
 
The objectives of HG 002 included, for the first time in
 
Korea, an explicit reference to lowering costs in order to pro­
vide housing which lower-income households could afford. In
 
addition, there was a strong concern for policy and institu­
tional development.
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2, Achievements
 
a. Execution
 
As was the case with HG 001, HG 002 was executed quickly. 
All the units were sold as planned, in spite of a prior concern 
that demand might be low in the secondary cities. 
b. 	Target Groups
 
As called for in the project paper, an end-user survey
 
was conducted for the HG 002 units. The survey concluded &4/
 
the following points.
 
1. 	The majority of 13-pyong apartments were
 
purchased by families with incomes between the
 
30th and 62nd percentiles.
 
2. 	The majority of 15-pyong apartments were pur­
chased by families with incomes betweeh the
 
47th and 71st per~entiles.
 
3. 	The occupants were spending from 15 to 31
 
percent of their incomes on the mortgage,
 
as compared to the 25-percent level antici­
pated in programming. A few were spending
 
as much as 40 percent.
 
It is possible, even likely, that there was some under­
reporting of incomes in the survey. Nevertheless, the survey
 
results indicated substantial achievements by AID in reaching
 
income groups below the 50th percentile, even though specific
 
percentile limits had not been made a condition of the project
 
paper.
 
L4 Department of State, Agency for International Devel­
opment. Housing Guaranty Papers Korea Housing Investment 
Guaranty FY 1975, Annex XV, pp. 2 - 6. AID, May 5, 1975. 
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c. Reductions in Costs
 
Relative to HG 001, HG 002 was a much lower-cost project.
In spite of its more difficult finance terms, it is still likely
to have reached lower-income groups. The 13-pyong units in
HG 002 were much lower in cost. However, the majerity of
HG 002 units were 15-pyong units. They cost almost as much as
the 22-pyong units of the previous year and required a higher
down payment as well as higher monthly payments. Steps were

taken to reduce costs still further in HG 003.
 
d. Terms of Finance
 
The decision to move from the variable-payments mortgage
system of HG 001 to the system used in HG 002 was based on two

considerations: 
 the need for a maintenance-of-value mechanism

which put more of the burden on government; and thu perceived

need to acquire experience with the variable-payment system
before relying heavily upon it. This resulted in terms less

amenable to the purchaser which were countered by reduction in
the size of the units in order to bring initial payments down.
 
C. HG 003 (1975) CONSTRUCTION OF
 
APARTNENTS IN SEOUL AND OTHER CITIES
 
HG 003 consisted, as did HG 002, of 13- and 15-pyong"

apartments. These were located in Seoul and other cities.
The amount of the loan was US$ 25 million --, the largest to
date'-- which financed the construction of 9,200 units.
 
The objectives of HG 003 were as follows.
 
1. To increase the housing stock in major urban
 
areas which could be owned by households
 
below the 50th percentile.
 
2. To encourage lower-income groups to adopt

apartment living in order to increase popula­
tion density of urban areas.
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3. To encourage KNHC to reduce costs through more
 
rigorous design and cost comparisons. 25/
 
The primary objective was to reduce costs, primarily
 
through redesign, and to thereby reach still lower-income
 
groups. Although relative costs were reduced substantially
 
in HG 003, a larger (50 percent) down payment was proposed ini-

This increased the intial capital required considerably.
tially. 

As the units were marketed, it became apparent that many house­
holds outside of Seoul did not have the capital to put up such
 
a large down payment. Therefore, a second loan for 20 percent
 
of the cost, repayable over five years at an interest rate of
 
9.5 percent, was made available to buyers. The prospective
 
purchaser was, thus, confronted either with higher initial
 
capital requirements or with much higher payments for the
 
first five years. The benefit of the 50 percent down payment
 
waL to increase the number of units that could be funded, but
 
it made the down payment the constraint upon a prospective
 
purchaser, rather than an income. The 50 percent down pay­
ment system is, nonetheless, closer to the present practice
 
when public-sector financing is not available and the house­
hold must borrow from family or use "key money." The KNHC
 
*anticipated that this might be a nroblem and had an option
 
in the HIG agreement which would have permitted them to rent
 
the units until they were sold, but this did not become
 
necessary and was not utilized. The maintenance-of-value
 
mechanism in HG 003 was the same as developed for HGv002
 
It made the home owner liable
after devaluation of the won. 

for increases in costs resulting from a devaluation up to a
 
fixed percentage with the government responsible for further
 
cost increases.
 
All of the units in the 1975 program were ondol heated,
 
with an improved forced-draft design which effectively elim­
inated health risks and resulted in a substantial,cost~reduc­
tion relative to the 1974 program. .
 
1. Relevance of Objectives-

For the first time, AID set for HG 003 the objective of
 
reaching income groups not higher than the 50th percentile.
 
25/ U.S. Government, Agency for International Development.
 
Housiq Guaranty Paper: Korea #HGO03, p. 20. USAID, May 5, 1975.
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This was to be achieved primarily through redesign, within the
 
existing apartment concept. The actual cost reductions achieved
 
were substantial. The objective which encourages increases in
 
density .nurban areas has greatest relevance for large cities
 
such as Seoul and Pusan.
 
2. Achievements
 
a. Execution and Occupancy
 
The physical construction of all units in HG 003 has
 
been completed, and most of the units have been occupied.

However, in November 1976, KNHC still had 241 unsold apart­
ments in different areas outside of Seoul. 26/ Some were
 
being advertised and a few had been sold. T-e primary
 
reason for the vacancies seemed to be that they were being

held for workers expected to occupy them upon completion

of certain industrial projects.
 
b. Target Groups
 
- Because the terms used for HG 003 differed from those 
used in HG 002, it is difticult to assess the likely income
 
groups that will occupy HG 003 apartments. Assuming the buyer

takes both the 50 percent and the 20 percent loans and is
 
willing to pay a minim=m of 25 percent income an the two loans,

the income range would be from approximately the 30th to the
 
65th percentiles.
 
c. Costs
 
One of the major objectives of HG 003 was to reduce
 
building costs, or at least to hold them below the rate of
 
inflation. This'objective was largely achieved by designing

and building improved ondol heating in the 15-pyong units and,
 
to a lesser extent, was achieved through better design. For
 
the sake of comparison, the cost of the 13-pyong units
 
increased at roughly 10 percent from those built in HG 002.
 
36/ National Savings and Loan League' .'2.
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This increase was somewhat below the rate of increase in 
building costs.
 
D. 	HG 005 (1976) CONSTRUCTION OF APARTMENTS
 
IN SEOUL AND SMALLER CITIES
 
The HG 005 program financed 4,710 units pf 7.5-,.10- and
 
13-pyong size in Seoul, Pusan and other cities. The total loan
 
was for US$ 15 million. Fifty percent financing was provided
 
for the units in Seoul, with 70 percent in the secondary cities
 
in order to allow the financing of as many units as possible.
 
A strong effort was made to reach tie lower-income groups by
 
introducing the smaller 7.5- and 10-pyong apartments.
 
The 	objectives of HG 005 were as follows.
 
1. 	To assist the ROKG to meet a broader seg­
ment of the lower-income housing demand,
 
-
utilizing high density to reduce per unit land 

costs.
 
2. 	To test the viability of "nuclear core" (small)
 
apartment units (7.5- and 10-pyong) as a means
 
of lowering shelter costs and reaching fami­
lies not presently benefiting from public
 
housing.
 
3. 	To assist ROKG to study its housing finance
 
system and consider alternatives which could
 
better meet the goals and investment require­
ments of the housing goals outlined in the
 
National Housing Policy. 27/
 
'Theunits outside of Seoul in the 1976 program were
 
ondol heated, and in Seoul they were centrally heated, in
 
'order to satisfy the needs of different families with differ­
ent habits and budgets.
 
27/ Department of State, Agency for International Devel­
opmeE. Project Paper: Republic of Korea-Korea National
 
Housing Corporation (K0HC). USAID, June 16, 1976. p. 6.
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The maintenance-of-value mechanism adopted in HG 005 was

essentially the same as in HG 003 with the home owner liable
 
up to a fixed amount and the government accepting any further
 
cost increases.
 
Relative to past KNHC practice, the 7.5- and 10-pyong

apartments represented a substantial innovation. Apartments

of this general size had been built previously, in the late 
1960s but not during the recent past.
 
1. Relevance of Objectives
 
As in HG 003, the objectives of HG 005 were a good frame­
work for a project intended to provide housing for the lower­
income groups. As in HG 003, the principal way to achie'a this
 
was to provide new housing in apartments, thus reducing land
 
costs. This strategy was most relevant in Seoul, Pusan and
 
smaller cities with severe land constraints. It was a less.

relevant plan for smaller cities where land values are lower
 
and distances much shorter.
 
2. Achievements
 
a. Execution and Occupancy
 
As of December 31, 1976, HG 005 was approximately 97 per­
cent complete in physical terms. Almost all of the apartments

have been constructed. The remaining work consists of interior
 
finishing, painting, street surfacing and landscaping. Con­
versations with KNHC officials in February 1977 indicated that,

although there were sufficient applications for the 13- and
 
10-pyong apartments, applications for the 7.5-pyong apartmentz
 
were being received slowly. Thus, there may be some problem

,in achieving market acceptance of the smallest units.
 
A visual inspection of these units revealed that the over­
all quality and appearance of the apartments and the neigh­
borhoods are good. The interior design provides minimal, but
 
adequate, space for living with entrance, kitchen and bath
 
facilities and one room (approximately eight feet by 150 feet)

which can be partitioned into two by the occupant.
 
Clearly, the 10-pyong, two-bedroom apartment is more
 
satisfactory. The market acceptability of the 7.5-pyong apart­
ments may ultimately depend on three key factors: 1) their
 
(unit costs are
cost relative to the 10- and 13-pyong units 

higher for the smaller units because of an equal amount of
 
stairway space); 2) the relative availability of other accom­
modation, including small rental units and small-site housing;
 
and 3) the degree of satisfaction of the first residents,
 
coupled with MNHC's persistence in offering the units for sale
 
in order to overcome initial buyer reluctance. It is the pre­
liminary opinion of this Case Study team that 7.5-pyong units
 
to 9.0-pyong units should be continued-in the
 or (say) 8.0-

larger cities, such as Seoul, while a row house or small sites
 
development program may be more acceptable and feasible in the
 
secondary cities.
 
b. Target Groups
 
The HG 005 apartments are smaller than HG 003 units, are
 financed on the
generally of similar design and costs, and are 

same terms. Therefore, it is to be expected that they will
 
The extent to which lower-income
reach lower-income groups. 

groups will actually occupy the units will depend, first, upon
 
a successful marketing and sales program and, secona, upon
 
either an ability to pay the 50 percent down payment required
 
or KNRC's willingness tc provide an additional "second" loan
 
(as was done for HG 003). Because of these unknowns, there is
 
some uncertainty over the population groups likely to occupy
 
the HG 005 apartments. Generally, however, they will have
 
incomes of W 86,000 per month or less and will be below the
 
median income. Depending upon the capital available to the
 
lower-income groups, the units could reach to the 20th per­
centile or go siqnificantly below it to the 10th percentile.
 
This would bA a substantial achievement indeed.
 
c.. Costs
 
The costs of the HG 005, 13-pyong apartments are approxi­
mately 10 percent higher than those constructed one year pre­
viously under HG 003. Thus, it is likely that costs were held
 
at or below the increase in general construction costs. It is
 
interesting to note that the costs per pyong increase substan­
tially for 10- and 7.5-pyong units relative to 13-pyong units.
 
In turn, this reduces the total cost difference. Furthermore,
 
the relative cost difference is greater between the 7.5- and
 
10-pyong units than between the 10- and 13-pyong units, sug­
gesting that the standards used for the 7.5-pyong units are
 
also relatively lower.
 
d. Financing
 
The financing proposed for the HG 005 project corrects 
the severe repayment problem created with the second (20 per­
cent) loan resorted to by KNHC in HG 003. The terms are 50 
percent financing in Seoul and 70 percent in the secondary 
cities, with a 10-year grace period and 15-yeaT amortization 
period. The same maintenance-of-value mechanism is used in 
HG 005 as in HG 003. This suggests that KNHC is relatively
happy with the present system. 
P A 0 
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Chapter IX
 
THE HOME IMPROVEMENT PROGRA4
 
The HIG Program for 1976 included, for the first time,
 
a borrower (Seoul City) other than KNHC. 
It also included
 
a new program concept, settlement upgrading instead of apart­
ments. Both these objectives had been very much sought by

AID from late 1974, following an AID technical assistance

mission 28/ that had reported that the physical potential
for upgraing in Seoul was excellent because of the basically

high standard of illegal settlement housing, the generally
good locations of the areas near employment and, most impor­tant, because of a substantial amount of settlement on land

already owned by Seoul City.
 
Senul and some of the other cities of Korea have, since
the late 1960s, practiced redevelpment of slum areas. In
 
some cases, particularly where most of the land was privately

owned, this meant improvement of streets and infrastructure

while retaining the existing housing. However, in many other
 
cases, redevelopment of slum areas meant total clearance and

construction of new housing units on the same site. 
 In the
latter case, the original slum house owners were given several
 
options.
 
1. Accept minimal financial compensation.
 
2. Purchase a lot with a KHB 1oan in the redevel­
opment area... 
3. Lease a city-owned rental housing unit. 
 .> 
4. 
Purchase a lot in a4.,uburban resettlement-area.
 
28/ See memorandums from Alfred P. Van Huyck, President

'of PADCO, to the Office of Housing pertaining to field visits
 
to Korea in October and December 1974.
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In the event of lot purchase, the terms ranged from
 
In most cases,
immediate cash to a five-year payment period. 

the original low-income house owners were unable to afford
 
a lot in the redevelopment area.
 
In addition to the loss of valuable housing stock, the
 
redevelopment program was not financially successful: the
 
Director of the Seoul City Housing Bureau puts the average
 
deficit at close to 30 percent.
 
Early discussions with Seoul City housing officers, in
 
late 1974 and early 1975, shcwed a large gap between the
 
objectives of settlement upgrading as conceived by AID and
 
the total demolition, replanning and reconstruction of areas
 
at very high physical standards as contemplated by Seoul
 
City. Even communication was difficult because both parties
 
were using the same words -- upgrading, rehabilitation, etc.
 
This led from a period
with completely opposite meanings. 

of thinking there was agreement on both sides to a discovery
 
that there was a misunderstanding.
 
For example, the AID mission in February 1975 negotiated
 
a memorandum of understanding which set forth guiding principles
 
for the Home Improvement Program. Yet, returning in June 1975
 
it was discovered that the specifics of that memorandum had
 
not been fully understood. The June 1975 AID mission redis­
cussed the basic principles and set forth a detailed handbook
 
report which included specific criteria for site selection as
 
well as the general principles to be followed.
 
It was recognized by all parties, however, that the spe­
cific details of the Home Improvement Program would have to
 
await detailed planning under specific field corfditions. It
 
was decided to proceed to authorize the HIG loan in advance of
 
obtaining detailed plans, because it was felt that this com­
mitment would facilitate preparation of the required plans.
 
AID, of course, retaired control over fund disbursements until
 
the plans and procedures were actually worked out in a satis-j
 
factory manner. This approach was correct, as it got the
 
program moving faster than would have been possible if all of
 
the prerequisite work had been demanded in advance while
 
involving no real loss of control by AID.
 
The National Housing Policy of May 1975, prepared by
 
the Ministry of Construction et al, added validity to the
 
effort to induce Seoul City to start on a Home Improvement Pro­
gram which would seek to preserve the maximum amount of the
 
existing housing stock in illegal settlement areas and to make
 
arrangements for providing these areas with secure land ten­
ure. AID took more initiative in pressing for this program
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than it had with other KNHC projects because of the reluctance
 
of Seoul City officials and because the technical issues were
 
new and very different from their previous experience. In
 
June 1975, AID sent a team of consultants to Korea to actu­
ally draft the outlines of the Home Improvement Program

it sought and to advise the Seoul City professional staff on
 
preparation of needed documentation.
 
On the February 1975 mission, it was discovered that Seoul
 
City had previously hired a Korean consulting fizm-to prepare
 
detailed plans for clearance and redevelopment of sonr 196
 
illegal settlement areas. Further, these plan drawings were
 
held in the Housing Office, waiting allocation of finance to
 
proceed. The initial reaction on the part of Seoul City was
 
to utilize these plans, even if the housing stock which did
 
not need to be moved for new, wide, high-standard streets,
 
abundant park lands, etc. was to be left. This, of course,
 
was unsatisfactory to AID. It pointed out that this
 
type of upgrading resulted in much too high a level of house
 
removal and that planning for upgrading was a different type

of approach. Nonetheless, the obvious reluctance to abandon
 
the elaborate plans previously prepared, coupled with their
 
inherent desire to raise physical standards, meant another
 
long period of review and discussion regarding fundamental
 
planning approach issues.
 
Although HG 004 was intended'to be financed in 1975 with
 
_HG 003, the implementation agreement was not signed untilJuly
 
1976, over a year after HG 003. The delays were basically
 
a result of the more complex nature of the project and of the
 
newness of the concepts.
 
The main point to be noted in this brief summary of a 
protracted and intensive dialogue is that the Korean view
 
should not be considered unusual or unreasonable on the part
 
of the Koreans. In most developing countries, the profes­
sional specialists trained in housing and planning come out
 
of a background of design architecture or engineering which
 
has provided them with little training in social and economic
 
or public finance issues (the essential cornerstone upon

which upgrading and sites and services projects are based).

Therefore, there is need for a reorientation which almist alway­
must take place before the protessional cadre of a country can
 
intellectually begin to support these forms of projects.
 
This is never a simple or quick process, even though it often
 
appears that it should be self-evident to the trained profes­
sionals of the international assistance agencies.
 
Facilitating the work of AID throughout these discussions
 
was the combined support of the KNHC, the Ministry of
 
Finance and, to a lesser extent, the Ministry of Construction.
 
(The MOC agreed in principle but had difficulty with a number
 
of the specifics, such as minimum lot sizes, etc.) The rea­
son for this combined support was, primarily, because of
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their own concern, fostered by AID, that the entire HIG Pro­
gram in Korea was dependent upon the achievement of a satis-

Here is an example of
factory upgrading program in Seoul. 

an appropriate use of leverage by AID and its closely-related
 
Korean counterpart agencies to introduce innovation. It
 
illustrates one of the main advantages of multi-year HIG lend­
ing programs and the build up of mutual respect and rapport.
 
It can be concluded that, had AID not had its previous
 
HIG projects for apartment construction, it would not have
 
been able to induce the settlement upgrading demonstration
 
project.
 
In spite of undertaking the initial demonstration proj­
ect, there is still much ahead before the process is
 
institutionalized in Seoul City. Only $600,000 of the ini­
tial U.S. $10 million loan has actually been disbursed.
 
A. HG 004 (1976) HOUSING
 
IMPROVEMENT IN SEOUL CITY
 
HG 004 is for the upgrading of several different squatter
 
and substandard areas of Seoul, with the final number to be
 
determined pending experience in actual implementation. The
 
total amount of the loan will be U.S. $10 million. At present,
 
a first project is underway at Oksoo: It involves a physical
 
area of 29,600 pyongs and contains 536 housing units accommo­
dating 1,200 households. The loan amount of the first project
 
is estimated at $600,000, which implies that it may be possible
 
with the entire loan to benefit approximately 20,000 house­
holds.
 
The objectives of the program were as follows:
 
I. To provide land tenure and improve housing and
 
the environment for lower-income groups.
 
,2. To demonstrate a method for upgrading that
 
would maximize the preservation of the exist­
ing housing stock while providing an accept­
able urban environment.
 
3. To demonstrate a method of financing that would
 
allow the program to be replicable within the
 
resources of the Korean economy.
 
14. To develop processes, institutions and staff
 
capable of sustaining the program.
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5. 	To influence Korean decision-making, by the
 
estabishment of objective criteria for asess­
ing the areas to be redeveloped and determining
 
a feasible program for minimal demolotion. 29/
 
Initial infrastructure improvementr in the first project
 
are underway. It is contemplat3d that the first project will
 
be completed in 1977. An excellent physical plan and a draft
 
administrative and financial plan have been prepared tor the
 
Oksoo project, which is likely to become the model for subse­
quent projects as well.
 
In addition to the Oksoo project, social surveys had
 
been undertaken in most, if not all, squatter areas in Seoul
 
and 	sites for additional projects to be undertaken under
 
HG 004 had been identified. Negotiations were being held
 
between AID and Seoul City to identify criteria for setting
 
priorities for the additional sites to be developed during
 
the 	1977 construction season.
 
The 	main concepts of the project are as follows:
 
1. The area selected is five kilometers from downtown
 
Seoul in a larger area with many hills which is densely built
 
,up. The topography of the site is rugged, with-steep slopes

and rocZ outcrops. Although there is some privately-owned

land in part of the project area, most of the land is ci y­
owned and most of the buildings are illegal. The quality of
 
the buildings ranges from very small, owner-built units of
 
temporary materials to larger houses of brick construction
 
and a quality that would be acceptable anywhere in Seoul.
 
2. The present occupants of the site include, in
 
roughly equal numbers, home owners and tenants. Many houses
 
are occupied by as many as three to four households, while
 
a few contain only one. The median family incomes, in late
 
1974 to early 1975, were W 50,000 and W 38,000 among home
 
owners and tenants, respectively. The median income for the
 
urban areas of Korea was approximately W 60,000, as of that
 
date, which indicates that the incomes in Oksoo are substan­
tially below average. Occupants include skilled and unskilled
 
factory workers, clerical workers, transportation workers
 
and workers in the services. Although the majority are in
 
unskilled or semiskilled occupations, there are a number of
 
skilled workers, public officials, teachers, doctors and
 
others. Of 1,200 households, 72 (or six percent) conduct
 
,
29/ U.S. Agency forInternational;Development. Project-
Paper: Republic of Korea,,1976, p. 10. USAIDj June 16,- 1976. 
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businesses in their own homes. Approximately 50 percent
 
of the owner's households are from the vicinity of Seoul.
 
The average household size is 5.0; most people live in nuclear
 
family situations.
 
3. The purpose of the project is to upgrade infrastruc­
ture by installing improved water lines with house connec­
tions, sewer lines (the present method is nightsoil disposal
 
by buckets emptied by sanitation workers), drainage and
 
widening streets. Many of the existing houses are to be
 
improved in place and some are to be replaced completely; but
 
only four are to be torn down without replacement.
 
A physical plan has been prepared which permit the work
 
to be accomplished with a minimum of loss in existing houses
 
and which retains existing lot boundaries wherever possible.
 
The main road system is sufficient to permit vehicular circu­
lation, while access to many houses is by improved pedestrian
 
walkways. In short, the improvements planned should be suffi­
cient to achieve a much-improved environment with an almost
 
negligible amount of dislocation and relatively low costs.
 
4. The project is adminsitered by Seoul City. A review
 
procedure has been established which allows the residents to
 
be informed about the plans and comment upon them through their
 
local representatives.
 
5. A pricing proposal has not yet been finalized. How­
ever, it is conceived that all the existing home owners will
 
be given the opportunity to purchase the land on which their
 
houses are built, at a price above the cost of infrastructure
 
and approximating the market value. For the purpose of land
 
purchase, the city is to provide loans covering up to 90 per­
cent c..1the cost which will be repayable over a period of
 
appr' cimately 24 years. Loans are also to be available for
 
home improvements, or home replacement, at up to maximum
 
amounts of W 600,000 and W 1,000,000, respectively. Although
 
the loans will not be intended to cover all of the costs,
 
there will be available to each household sufficient finan­
cing to enable most to purchase the land and improve or replace
 
their homes. The project is expected to yield a financial
 
surplus for the city as the repayments for the land are received.
 
Under these terms, it is expected that a large number of
 
households can be made substantially better off, at relatively
 
little capital cost and without financial subsidy. 30/
 
3Q/ The sources of Oksoo #3 project data are unpublished
 
docume'nts provided to AID by the Seoul City Office of Hous­
ing. They include data from social and physical field sur­
veys and from a draft Redevelopment Plan.
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B.,,SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS
 
1. Relevance of Objectives
 
The objectives set for HG 004 are directly relevant ti
 
the problems of upgrading and of providing housing for the
 
lowest-income groups in Korea. In short, they are a sound
 
foundation for the project work to be undertaken. They are
 
well within the objectives sought by AID.
 
2. Achievements
 
a. Execution
 
Unfortunately, HG 004 as a whole has moved much more
 
slowly than any of the other projects undertaken, from the
 
time of initial negotiation until the present. Except for
 
social field surveys, the only significant action that has
 
been taken in the field has been in Oksoo, and this has itself
 
gone relatively slowly, with infrastructure improvements span­
ning two construction seasons instead of the one normally

required in a new site development project. There have also
 
been donsiderable delays in the administrative, land purchase

and house-building aspects of the project.
 
Nevertheless, this type of project is basically new to
 
the staff involved and many aspects have had to be learned
 
by actual experience. Furthermore, upgrading is much more
 
complex administratively, physically and sociallt than build­
ing new apartments. Hence, the possibility of delay is
 
greater.
 
In spite of the progress achieved, there is the possi­
bility that the slow execution may be the result of a linger­
ing commitment in the Seoul City government. For this reason,
 
the 1977 construction season looms as a crucial time in which
 
overall support or lack of support for the project is likely
 
to be demonstrated in action.
 
b. Target Groups
 
As described above, the existing population of Oksoo and
 
the other slum areas in which upgrading is contemplated is
 
substantially below the average income level. Most residents',

incomes are below the median while many are close to the low­
est income levels., The project as presently formulated is 01
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likely to cause a few of the poorer home owners to lose their
 It may
houses because of a inability to qualify for a loan. 

result in rents being raised in houses which are improved.
 
Thus, it may cause some hardship upon a few; but the overall
 
improvements in basic human welfare for the majority will be
 
substantial.
 
c. Physical Viabi34=
 
The Oksoo improvement plans will accomplish a greatly
 
improved environment for the residents and allow emergency
 Through the
and heavy vehicles access to all the houses. 

improvement program proposed, the area should become equal
 
in physical standard3 to most of the lower-middle-income
 
areas of Seoul in which small, single apartment houses have
 
been constructed. Continuing house improvements and, perhaps,
 
subsequent neighborhood improvements, building upon the base
 
that is established, should result in a viable and healthy
 
area with long-term occupation potential.
 
d. Financial
 
There remains considerable uncertainty over the prices
 
that can be charged while still accomplishing the social
 
objectives of the upgrading projects and, hence, over the
 Nevertheless,
long-range financial viability of the projects. 

owners will be acceptable credit
it appears that most home 

risks and that the projects should, if managed well in a suit­
able political framework, achieve an acceptable financial
 
return to permit an ongoing program that will in time be able
 
to improve most of the areas in which improvement is required.
 
e. Institutional
 
The institutional changes within Seoul City facilitated
 
by AID'include the fpllowing: First, the creation within
 
the Seoul City Office of Housing of a special unit to manage
 
This unit has been staffed and
tho Hbme Improvement Program. 

has produced an excellent draft project plan. Second, the
 
creation of a field office on the Oksoo site which sets a
 
precedent for achievement of good community relations in
 
subsequent projects.
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C. KNHC UPGRADING PROJECTS
 
AID har proposed, and the Korean Government has accepted
in principle, a second U.S. $15 million upgrading loan to
provide finance for a Home Improvement Program in the secon­dary cities in 1977 and 1978. 
 The project is conceived to be

similar to the one in Seoul, except that instead of negotiating

with the city governments directly KNHC will act as the over­
all administrator to work in cooperation with the cities.
Individual cities have been asked to express interest in the
 
program.
 
Eight tentative sites have been selected in four cities

and socioeconomic surveys will be initiated shortly to aid
in project formulation and final site selection. 
The method

of identifying potential projects was to make known, through
the Ministry of Home Affairs, that the funding was available,

with individual cities to decide their interest.
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PART THREE'
 
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE HIG PROGRAM
 
Chapter X
 
AN OVERVIEW OF-.THE'ISSUES,
 
The Korean case study has provided an opportunity for
 
analysis of a complex multi-year program in one particular
 
country situation. While the case study has revealed the
 
overall positive impact of the HIG Program in Korea, it has
 
also pointed to some shortcomings which might have been pre­
vented with better forward planning. It has also at least raised
 
the possibility that more might have been accomplished, if a
 
specific overall strategy had been formulated in the beginning
 
and negotiated out with the Koreans to provide a frame of
 
reference for the program.
 
For example, it is an open question whether AID could
 
have had a greater influence on the Korean Housing Bank (had
 
thip issue been addressed as a part of a comprehensive strat­
egy). If KENC, MOC, and the Ministry of Finance had committed
 
their leverage to obtain the needed reforms, it is likely
 
that it would have helped. Technical assistance might also
 
have been more effectively utilized if the objectives sought

had been more specifically agreed upon in advance.
 
In the paragraphs which follow, one possible approach
 
to forward planning for multiple-year lending programs is
 
presented. There are, of course, many variations which
 
would suggest themselves in specific country contexts. The
 
starting point is an understanding that, almost invariably,
 
there will be a similiar set of general problem areas to be
 
addressed in the housing sector of any developing country.
 
A. 	 THE GENERAL PROBLEM AREAS 
TO BE ADDRESSED 
There are certain general problem areas in the shelter
 
sector of most developing countries which, while differing
 
in importance, are usually of concern. These are the central
 
PAMDCO
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Lssues which must be addressed, if a comprehensive shelter
 
sector program is to be undertaken. Among the most common'
 
?rpblems are the following:
 
1. 	The housing deficit is growing annually in
 
spite of the level of the public sector
 
response.
 
2. 	The public sector is meeting only a small per­
centage of the housing deficit.
 
3. 	The private sector is focused mainly on upper
 
income, luxury housing (sometimes because of
 
public sector policies which make it difficult
 
for the private sector to meet low- and middle­
income housing requirements).
 
4. 	The informal sector is providing the vast major­
ity of low-income hcusing units, but often in,
 
an uncontrolled, illegal manner without adequate
 
infrastructure services and totally outside pub­
lic 	shelter sector strategies.
 
5. There are inadequate supplies of land in urban
 
areas available for housing and development at
 
reasonable prices.
 
6. 	There are overall capital resource constraints
 
in both the public and private sectors. Housing
 
finance institutions are inadequately developed,
 
private sector savings are insufficiently mobi­
lized and interest rate policies are frequently
 
inadequate to support viable lending programs
 
without annual subsidies.
 
7. 	 There are serious deficiencies in the adminis­
trative and technical capacities of agencies 
responsible for the shelter sector (but this 
was not a problem in Korea). 
8. 	There are constraints in the construction sec­
tor which limit capacity and lead to higher
 
costs than necessary. In some cases, there
 
are severe building material availability con­
straints.
 
An effective housing delivery system can only be devel­
oped when a comprehensive approach is taken to dealing with
 
all of these problem areas. The starting point for this
 
approach is the establishment of a National Housing Policy.
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF A NATIONAL
 
HOUSING POLICY AND PLAN
 
The housing policy document defines overall objectives

and'esponsibilities of various participanta in the housing
 
,delivery system, sets broad general directions for the kinds
 
of housing to be developed, sets priorities for delivery of
 
housing to various income groups and other special target
 
groups, sets general financial terms and conditions,'and sets
 
the role and dimensions of possible s'ubsidies.
 
The housing plan, on the other hand, implements policy
 
and is measurable against it. It sets forth a specific pro­
gram of action to achieve certain goals in terms of selected
 
time, place and means. It Aust, therefore, present quanti­
fied objectives and a more detailed methodology than the
 
policy statement and present it so that both implementation
 
and evaluation can be traced out clearly.
 
AID should view its role, in housing policy and plan

formulation, as stimulating the developing country to recog­
nize the importance of a National Housing Policy; providing

l.imited technical assistance in determining how t- prepare
 
a National Housing Policy; and providing access to worldwide
 
experience in order to assist the country in understanding
 
the range of options and solutions which other countries have
 
adopted. AID should not attempt to provide foreign advisers
 
for the purpose of actually drafting the housing policy itself.
 
Only when the developing country's own housing institutions
 
and appropriate ministries are participants in housing pol­
icy formulation is there any hope that the resulting docu­
ment can actually be utilized to guide implementation.
 
The Housing Guaranty Program should be used to support
 
comprehensive housing policy and plan implementation and
 
should operate within their guidelines and objectives.
 
If it can be assumed that the essential contribution
 
of housing guaranty loans is for their development objec­
tives, rather than for their capital substitution impli­
cations, then a national strategy for housing needs to be
 
developed within which the program can serve an essentially

catalystic role.
 
The Office of Housing has implicitly recognized this
 
already. Its commitment to undertake shelter sector analy­
ses and to support housing policy preparation are clearly
 
moving toward the kind of overall strategy suggested here.
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C. CONSTRAINTS TO BE OVERCOME
 
Nonetheless, the development of a system for establish­
,i4 a multiple-year lending program is much easier in theory
than in practice. There are several reasons for this: 
1. The commitment to maximizing the allocation of 
resources to the lowest-income groups is frequently not the
 
priority of the host country government. It should bi noted
 
that priority is more often given to assisting middle-income
 
families to meet their shelter requirements. This position

on the part of developing countries is not without merit, as
 
all income groups are facing a critical housing shortage and
 
middle-income groups are often thought to be among the most
 
productive elements of a developing country's society and,

therefore, deserving of priority. Nonetheless, the commit­
ment of the international agencies such as the Office of
 
Housing is, and must be, to work with low-income groups.
 
2. At any given period of time when discussions begin
between the Office of Housing and a particular country, there 
are already in place many policies, programs and procedures
which cannot be quickly or easily changed to conform with thedesired objectives. There must be allowances made for the
 
time frame required to institute changes, even after all par­
ties are in agreement as to the desirability of those changes.
 
3. The total overall lack of housing finance resources

within the country and the insufficient mobilization of pri­
vate savings can only be corrected over a considerable time
 
period. The rationalization of interest rates frequently

requires careful study and incremental change, because of
 
the complex financing formulas used in all development sec­
tors, including housing, and their overall impact on national
 
economic development.
 
4. The lack of technical and administrative capacity

within the housing agencies in the host country cannot be
 
corrected in the immediate future but will require staff
 
build up and training as well as improved management pro­
cedures.
 
5. There is a reluctance upon the part of the political

leadership of a country to take risks by instituting com-­
pletely new concepts and technologies. This point cannot be
 
overstated, because it is often the case that the political

leadership will view housing with a very short-term perspec­
tive in which the emphasis will be on maximizing public

housing construction of the traditional kind without much
 
regard for the long-term implications (which are, in fact,
 
problems for future leadership generations and, therefore,
 
not of major concern to the present).
 
This set of issues suggests that it is unrealistic for
 
the Office of Housing to assume that a developing country

will be in a position to make comprehensive changes along

the lines felt necessary as a front-end commAtment to par­
ticipating in the Housing Guaranty Program. What is needed,
 
therefore, is an approach in which, through multiple-year

housing guaranty lending, a comprehensive series of changes
 
can be achieved within the host country at a pace which can
 
be supported politically and implemented technically. This
 
requires a Zorward-planning approach which allows the Office
 
ot Housing to initiate support activities and provide an
 
initial housing guaranty loan while, at the same time,
 
achieving successive phases of fundamental change in the
 
overall housing delivery system of the developing country.
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Chapter XI
 
A\POSSIBLE PROGRAM STRATEGY FOR
 
THE OFFICE OF HOUSING, AID
 
The foregoing discussion in Chapter X of the Office of 
Housing and the Housing Guaranty Program Suggests that a more 
comprehensive approach is needed. More emphasis is needed on
 
forward planning with the host country borrowers.
 
A. BACKGROUND ACTIVITIES
 
The Office of Housing should move to establish a back­
ground research capability in-house. This should take the
 
form of a small unit of one or two professionals who would
 
be responsible for monitoring housing trends and develop­
ments within the developing countries. Each of the devel­
oping countries is essentially a marketing opportunity (not
 
only in the sense of capital lending but also in accordance
 
with the developmental objectives of the Office of Housing) as
 
delineated by overall AID policy and United States foreign
 
policy objectives. However, the capacity of individual devel­
oping countries to utilize housing guaranty funds and the
 
potentials for achieving desired developmental objectives dif­
fers greatly by country and region. It should be the respon­
sibility of the research unit to provide an up-to-date profile
 
on the housing sectors of each of these countries using second­
ary source data. In this way, logical priorities for the
 
Office of Housing can be established and initiatives can be
 
taken rather than waiting to be contacted by potential client
 
country agencies.
 
The research unit should be responsible fcr monitoring
 
technical innovation in the housinig sector, so that the staff
 
of the Office of Housing is appraised of potential new tech­
niques and approaches worthy of Investigation when actually
 
developing a specific country program.
 
The research unit should be utilized to undertake,
 
thrcugh in-house staff or by contract, preparation of a casual
 
papor series on various topics of concern about housing iti',the
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developing countries. These papers should be disseminated
 
throughout the developing-country world, in order to transfer
 
needed information, to establish the Office of Housing as a
 
leader in the field and to underscore the primary developmental

objectives which it seeks to achieve through the Housing

Guaranty Program.
 
The research unit could, also, assist in arranging appro­
priate training and short courses in related housing sector
 
fields. The Office of Housing already is supporting training

in the savings and loan management field through its work with
 
the Institute of Financial Education. The need, however, is
 
for a much greater concern with training as a method of
 
increasing the total capacity of the housing professionals in
 
the developing countries. Such training programs as may be
 
instituted for particular developing country personnel should
 
be integrated into the overall housing development program

described below.
 
B. DEVELOPING A MULTIPLE-YEAR LENDING PROGRAM 
The concept of a multiple-year program will allow the 
Office of Housing to work with the individual developing coun­
try to establish a series of benchmark objectives and to assess 
the host country to achieve them through time. 
The steps contemplated in a multiple-year lending program
 
are as follows.
 
1. Prepare the PID
 
After the initial contact is made to the Office of Housing,
 
a PID should be prepared, as soon as possible, based on a short

mission to the developing country and the review of secondary
 
source information.
 
2. Prepare the Shelter Sector Analysis
 
Once the PID is approved, the Office of Housing should
 
prepare the shelter sector analysis. The basic format now in
 
use is essentially good and should be retained. Additional
 
emphasis should be placed, however, on attempting to define the
 
specific options which the host country might adopt in response

to the problems identified. These options would become the
 
first cut in describing the objectives of the multiple-year
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program. At the same time, the shelter sector analysis could.be expanded to make an initial, approximate estimate as to the
number of loans and aggregate amounts which might be appro­priate and to identify the various host country institutions 
which need to be involved as either borrowers or technical
 
participants in the program. 
The nature of initial projects

should be approximated as to type.
 
3. Prepare the PRP
 
The PRP should be developed for the first potential loan 
and should generalize the overall objectives of the multiple­year program (which would not specifically be a part of theinitial PRP). 
 The usual PRP format is entirely appropriatefor this. The main point of the 4nitial loan is to seek out 
a suitable project objective which is recognized by the host 
country as desirable and which falls within the overall AID
mandate. It need not require that all housing prdblem issuesbe addressed or, even, that totally new and innovative pro­posals be made. The concern is to introduce the country to 
the values of collaboration with the Office of Housing and' toform the basis for succeeding loans to implement other aspects
of the overall program. 
4. -Prepare the PP
 
During preparation of the PP, negotiation as to what

changes can be made easily by the host country (in accordance
with the options and analysis developed in the Shelter Sector
Analysis) would be taken up as well as, of course, detaileddevelopment of the. initial project. A firm commitment on the part of the host country to prepare a National Housing Policy
in a manner similar to that described in the Office of Housing
booklet "Preparing a National Housing Policy" should be
 
obtained as part of the PP. It should, further, be agreed that
 
a detailed program of housing sector development will be pre­pared during the implementation stage of the first project
(essentially the housing plan) along with the 
housing policy.

The mutual agreement on this policy and plan document will be
prerequisite to continuing the Housing Guaranty Program.
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5. Project Implementation
 
During the implementation period of the first project,
work will go ahead on the housing policy and plan. AID may 
or may not provide technical assistance, depending on profes­
sional resources available in the country. Even in cases 
when AID does not provide support, there should be peziodic
reviews of work to ensure that the results will be at a stan­
dard suitable for review and discussion at the conclusion of 
the work. 
6. Sacond PID, PRP, PP 
The second Housing Guaranty Loan should accomplish a
 
different purpose than the first (in keeping with develop­
mental objectives of AID rather than capital assistance alone).

For example, if the original loan was for small, complete,
 
housing units for the 40th percentile of the income curve,

the second loan should introduce sites and services or set­
tlement upgrading concepts for lower-income groups. As a
 
prerequisite for the second loan, however, there should be
 
a negotiation on the total Housing Guaranty Program contem­
plated, so that a definite level of funding is outlined and so
 
specific primary and secondary objectives are established for
 
achievement with each of the loans contemplated. Note'that no
 
specific time schedule needs to be established, although some
 
time frame should be tentatively adopted. This is because
 
each successive Housing Guaranty Loan in the package should
 
be made available depending on the host country's achievement
 
of the objectives (or performance criteria) established. This
 
may or may not allow time-specific prograning in any individ­
ual case.
 
It might appear difficult to establish such specific

objectives (for example, the establishment of a housing bank,
 
land bank, or changes in specific legislation, etc.), but if
 
the work on the National Housing Policy and Plan has been 
accomplished satisfactorily, these kinds of specific objectives

should have been agreed to in principle at the time the housing

policy was adopted by the appropriate level of government.
 
The normal AID process of a PID, PRP and PP can be fol­
lowed with only the second loan showing a firm commitment on 
the part of AID. The full program would only be a matter of 
intent, depending on the future availability of funds and the
 
host country performance.
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7. The Third Loan
 
The third loan in the series would follow the same AID
 
review process, but would require the achievement of the

agreed-upon objectives or performance standards as set forth
in the second loan agreement. And so on, through completion

of the multiple-year program. At any point at which the coun­try fails to execute its performance standard agreement, the

overall program comes to a halt pending successful completion

94 that part of the overall work program. Of course, AID
 
evaluation is built into each successive stage of the work.
 
C. ADVANTAGES OF THE MULTIPLE-

YEAR PROGRAMMING APPROACH
 
The main difference between the approach outlined above
 
and present Office of Housing multiple-year projects is that

the recommended approach is preplanned, with benchmark achieve­
ments acting as the signals to proceed. This allows for steady

achievement by the developing country at its own speed, essen­tially utilizing its own capacity. It may be appropriate, if
 
significant or particularly complex programs are being contem­
plated, for AID to provide a resident adviser to assist the
 host country and provide sustained -support.. However, it would
be undesirable for AID to actually accept the technical burden
 
of executing for the host country any of the specific steps

within the program. Technical assistance should be thought

of as catalytic and supportive, but the responsibility should
 be clearly that of the host country to fulfill the overall
 
program objectives.
 
The main advantages of the planned and programmed

pultiple-year approach outlined here are as follows.
 
1. 	It firmly establishes AID's basic objective
 
as developmental in nature, as opposed to merely

being a capital assistance program.
 
2. 	It allows the AID structure to comprehend
 
, the total program at one time instead of pieces

of a program submitted periodically. This,
 
in turn, allows AID to carry out a more pre-

Scise evaluation for each successive loan.
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3. 	it establishes an upper limit to the total
 
commitment of funds to any one ccuntry, based
 
on achieving defined development objectives.
 
Therefore, it will allow for more precise
 
identification of the overall total authori­
zation levels required by the Office of Housing
 
to meet its development program objectives.
 
4. 	it will increase AID's leverage to achieve
 
change within a given country, by increasing
 
the total amount .of funds which might be 
available. Simply stated, the amount of 
change a country is willing to undertake may 
be influenced by whether or not the potential
 
funds are US$ 5 to 10 million or US$ 40 to 50
 
million.
 
5. 	It, also, allows a flexible schedule for
 
achieving changes which can be coordinated
 
with the real capacities and constraints
 
of the developing country rather than through
 
a schedule imposed from outside.
 
6. 	By identifying all the target borrowers in
 
a comprehensive program, it will allow pre­
liminary wcrk to take place prior to the
 
actual provision of the loan funds. For
 
example, if a third or fourth loan is antici­
pated for a housing finance organization
 
(say, after several loans supporting a housing
 
corporation), preparation for the loan and,
 
perhaps, modest technical assistance can be
 
provided in advance and the agency can pre­
pare to execute the loan. This should greatly
 
increase the rate of disbursement of loans
 
when actually made.
 
7. 	From the point of view of the developing coun­
try, this approach allows for much better
 
national economic planning. It allows for
 
individual agencies to plan for their specific
 
part of the program while, at the same time,
 
making c'.ear the limits of the support they
 
can expect. This will preclude agencies from
 
becoming dependent on housing guaranty funds
 
to sustain their level of effort. Finally,
 
-114­
it allows the host country to deal realistic­
ally and flexibly with its most difficult
 
housing sector problems over a sufficiently

long time frame to ensure successful innova­
tion and change with sustained support from
 
AID.
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Appendix I
 
THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER AGENCIES
 
Appendtx.1
 
'THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER 'AGENCIES
 
NTRODUCTION
 
At this time, only two agencies have been involved in
 
Korean housing in addition to AID: the United Nations (which

sponsored technical assistance during 1974/75 for prepara­tion of a national physical plan and a regional plan for the
Gwanqju Region); and the World Bank (which is currently
financing sites and services development in Gwangju, %ogpu

and Yosu as part of a regional development project in the
 
Gwangju Region.
 
A. THE UNITED NATIONS GWANGJU
 
HOUSING PROPOSALS
 
The recommendations of the United Nations Gwangju regional

planning study with respect to housing are described in a
 
report entitled Gwanaju Region Second Cycle Report: Supple­
ment to Volume V: Urban Land Use Plans and Housing. The key

findings of the report are as follows:
 
1. 	There exists an overall shortage of housing

in the Gwangju Region which is similar to

the national shortage -- a relatively high­
quality housing stock with a substantially
 
greater number of households than housing
 
units.
 
2. 	There is available little or no long-term

housing finance.
 
3. 	Relatively small-scale land development

projects are being carried out by cities,

often in cooperation with private developers.
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4. 	Most housing is being built by private builders,

often under contract to known buyers and some­
times on speculation. The typical rate is
 
two or three units per year and sometimes
 
as much as eight or 10 units, but seldom more.
 
5. 	Public land development is slow because of
 
a lack of capital financing. No financing
 
comes out of the budgets.
 
6. 	Private land development financing is also
 
limited because of a lack of institutionalized
 
sources of capital.
 
7. 	 Public housing programs are limited to those 
in the cities and KNHC's AID-financed apart­
ments. The latter are successful as rental 
units but are slow in some cities as sales 
units. 
8. 	Overall, tnere are a lack of housing sites
 
and means of building within the reach of
 
the lowest-income groups.
 
9. 	For most families, there must be long periods
 
of saving and living in rental units before
 
they are able to save enough to purchase a
 
house.
 
The recommendations, although brief, generally follow
 
along the lines being pursued in actual projects by both
 
AID and the World Bank, as follows:
 
1. 	A study is recommended of the feasibility
 
,
of expanded external finance for housing.­
2. A private housing finance system is institu­
tionalized. 
3. 	Comprehensive land studies, land banking for
 
low-income housing and increases in the property

tax rate are recommended to discourage land
 
speculation.
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4. 	A revolving fund is suggested to finance pur­
chase and'development of land by cities.
 
5. 	Training is undertaken in housing, land devel­
opment and management.
 
6. 	Criteria are established for allocating credit
 
in accordance with social objectives of pro-*
 
viding housing for low-income persons, rather
 
than in accordance with the size and quality
 
of the house.
 
7., 	Subsidies are eliminated except for the lowestT 
income groups. 
8. 	Expandable minimum housing is investigated.
 
'
 9. 	A national center for research in housing and ,
 
urban development is established.
 
Steps have been taken recently in Korea to reduce land
 
speculation, not through increased property taxes but through
 
the imposition of a capital gains tax on land sales. National
 
housing funds are being used at present for smaller housing
 
units whereas, in Gwangju in 1975, they were restricted to
 
18-pyong units or larger. Consideration is being given in the
 
Mogpu site and in MOC to the possibility of core housing as
 
a means of reducing initial government outlay. In addition,
 
the research facilities of KHNC have been expanded and
 
strengthened considerably.
 
B. THE WORLD BANK GWANGJU
 
REGION HOUSING PROJECTS
 
The World Bank has been interested in Korean housing
 
since 1974. During this time, it has discussed with ROKG
 
two housing projects of relevance to the present case study.
 
The first was a development project for low-income expandable
 
core housing to be located northeast of Jamsil, south of the
 
Han River in Seoul. The Government later decided to relocate
 
the project to a number of secondary cities. The second is
 
a sites and services project at three sites in separate cities
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Figure 16. World Bank-financed small sites develop­
ment project, near Gwangju.
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in the Gwangja Region.' It was accepted by the Government
 
and is now under construction.
 
The Gwangju World Bank housing project was intended by

the World Bank to accommodate a mix of population groups,

predominately low-income but also middle- and high-income.

Three sites were selected in the cities of Gwangju, Mogpo,

and Yosu. The three are roughly equal in size with 500 to
 
700 units in each project. They are sufficient to support
 
a small market and basic social services. The range of plot

sizes was from 35 to 70 pyongs, with about 75 percent in the
 
smallest category. The project has been redesigned to pro­
duce a larger number of smaller lots in the range of 28 to
 
35 pyongs. Instead of housing construction by site purchases,

core-expandable houses in the range of 10 to 12 pyongs are to
 
be constructed by KN11C which will require some finishing by

the home owners. To reduce costs, the units will be in a
 
duplex and quadraplex configuration.
 
The World Bank and the MOC appear to have reached agree­
ment on an approach which minimizes public expenditures through
 
core house construction and a limited degree of self-help build­
ing. The infrastructure standards as built in the Gwangju

project (the only one visited by the research team) are very

high, with substantial earthworks, a large box culvert running

-the length of the project, and full house-to-house water supply
 
and sewerage.
 
Interviews were held with the MOC Section Chief of the
 
Regional Planning Section of the National Planning Bureau and
 
with the Chief of the Planning Research Unit, Gwangju Regional
 
Development Unit. In addition, a visit was made to the site
 
of the Gwangju City project and an interview was held with the
 
resident site engineer.
 
The project marketing is to be basically competitive,

through newspaper advertisement. The marketing plan is cur­
rently under preparation. 

, -
Depending upon whether the lot has a house constructed,,
 
on it by the public agency or not, loans are available sepa­
rately for lot purchase and housing,finance. The terms of,,
 
the lot purchase loans are to be as follows:
 
Pyong Percent Interest /

Lot Size Down Rate .ems 
-
35 20 "12' 15 
50 50 12 15'
 
70' Cash Only
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e term of the housing finance loans are as follows-, 
yong 
Lot-Size,,, 
Percent 
Down 
Interest 
Rate Terms 
o3520 12 15 
50 20 12 15 
70 50 12 15 
Thus, the project breaks ground in providing long-term 
finance for lot purchase. This is something that has not been 
tried previously in Korea. 
It was reported by the regional representative interviewed
 
that the international competition procedures of the World Bank
 
for construction bids were regarded as cumbersome and time­
consuming. He regarded them as wasteful of effort in Korea'
 
because the local construction firms are able to provide ser­
vices at costs substantially below those of international con­
tractors.
 
1. Su.miary 
At the outset, it must be realized that the World Bank
 
Gwangju projects (although they do add several useful dimen­
sions to Korean housing policy), are not equivalent to sites
 
and services projects in the sense used to describe such proj­
ects in less-developed countries in tropical areas. They
 
are now supportinq lower-cost small-size housing development
 
projects, with a provision for a portion of the housing to
 
be built by self-help techniques.
 
The infrastructure standards and land development costs
 
are quite high. However, by reducing plot and house sizes,
 
it is expected that on the smallest lot the 10-pyong core
 
unit will cost less than the 10- or 7.5-pyong apartment units
 
currently being constructed by KNHC. The issue of housing
 
standards remains to be resolved with the Koreans as the
 
project is encountering many of the same problems that have
 
faced AID in recent years. The recent readjustments in the
 
nature of the Gwangju project represent a long step toward
 
achieving lower-cost housing.
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2. Effectiveness in Implementation
 
The loan and project agreements were signed in January

1975 and construction began in July 1976. The delay in start­
up was a result of the time taken to set up the unit (Gr 7)
 
to'implement the project.
 
3. Target Groups
 
Analysis of the costs of the project indicates that the,
 
lowest-income groups reached will be lower than those reached
 
through the 7.5-pyong apartment program of K{C because of
 
the easier terms available for site and house loans and because
 
of the lowered costs made possible by reducing site sizes.
 
4. Speculation
 
There is some concern by Korean professionals that there
 
will be insufficient demand in Mogpu or Yosu which will result
 
in slow sales. Furthermore, it is feared that there will be
 
substantial land speculation, in anticipation of rising land
 
prices. There is proposed an administrative restriction on
 
resale. Speculation may be constrained by charging market
 
prices for the larger lots and the reduction of lot sizes so
 
that they will not be as valuable for middle-income housing.
 
5. Approach to Housing
 
Clearly, the project attempts to break through by intro­
duction of core housing and self-help housing concepts. The
 
overall concept of strong public support for a small sites
 
development project adds a useful dimension to Korean housing
 
policy in the secondary cities. This, combined with the AID
 
squatter upgrading projects and apartment projects (the latter
 
in higher land-value locations), holds promise of meeting the
 
most urgent Korean lower-income housing needs. The extent
 
to which the approach will be accepted by the Koreans remains
 
to be determined, however. It is apparent that the lot sizes
 
and infrastructure standards must be substantially reduced to
 
generate housing for the lowest-income groups.
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6. Costs
 
The cost analysis presented in this section indicates
 
that the costs of a 35-pyong lot with a public or contractor­
built 13-pyong house are likely to be roughly the same as for
 
If cost savings are achieved,
a 13-pyong KNHC-built apartment. 

they are likely to be a result of lower construction standards
 Substantial cost reduc­as wel: as smaller lot and house sizes. 

tions can be achieved, however, either by constructing a core
 
house and allowing completion by self-help techniques or by
 
allowing comple.i delf-help construction. It is possible,
 
also, that a contractor-built house could cost less than an
 
apartment, if overhead and labor costs are kept sufficiently
 
low.
 
Thus, the argument that a small-sites development proj­
ect can reduce costs is not completely persuasive by itself.
 
It becomes more persuasive when coupled with the arguments
 
that the purchaser of a small lot has more opportunity to
 
add to his house as required, that he benefits more directly
 
from increases in land value as a result of urban growth, and
 
that the overall public expenditures can be reduced by allow­
ing incremental additions ro housing.
 
7. Financing
 
The Gwangju project breaks important new ground in pro­
viding long-term financing for lot purchase. It also provides
 
what is basically a line of credit for housing construction
 
linked to a particular project, thus increasing the project's
 
likely financial viability.
 
8. Assistance in Self-Help Building
 
It is reported that a guide for self-help builders.-is
 
currently under preparation. If completed and used in Korea;
 
this would be a useful addition to the tools available to,,.
 
improve low-income housing.
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Gwangju 
Mog" 
Yeasu 

Totals 

NOTES: 

Gwangju 

Mogpo 

Yeasu 

Totals 

NOTE: 

SOURCE: 

Lot 

Size,/ 

35 

50 

170 

NOTES: 

SOURCE: 

TABLE 22
 
Project Costs of World Bank
 
Gwangju Housing Project
 
(in millions of won)
 
Land Profes-
Civil Acqui- sional 
Works 1/ siton 1/ Services 1/ Total 
559 357 38 954
 
847 138 40 1,025 
610 105 32 747 
2,016 600 110 2,726
 
1 Muent ROKG estimates, based upon initial 
lids. ;/ 1974 IBRD appraisal report. 
TABLE 23
 
Lot Sizes of World Bank
 
Gwangju Housing Project
 
'3/Could be reduced to Approximately 2,100,000 won
 by self-building a 12 pyong house or to approxi­
mately 1,600,000 won by self-building a 7 pyong
 
core house.
 
1974 IBID appraisal report.
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Lot Size 

(Pyongs) 

35 

50 

70 

Percent Total Area 
of units (pyongs) 
75 47,9915
 
16 14,500
 
12,390
 
100 74,875
 
Cost per pyong 36,410 won.
 
1974 IBRD appraisal report.
 
TABLE 24
 
Lot and Housing Costs of
 
World Bank Gwangia Housing Project
 
Percent Cross-

House Cross- Subsidized House
 
Size Subsidy Lot Costs Cost 2/ Total Cost
 
12-15 

15-18 

19-25 

/ Pyongs. 
Number of 

Units 

1,371 

290 

1709 

1,838 

20 1,019,500 1,701,000 2,720,500 3/

10 1,638,500 2,079,000 3,717,500 ­
0 2,548,700 2,709,000 5,257,700
 
2/ At 126,000 won per pyong.
 
T Appendix, I
 
STATISTICAL'SUMMARY OF HIGPROJECTS,
 
Project HG 60li-
Banpo Apartmient.' Phase ZZ 
1. 	Applications
 
April 1972
 
2. 	Location:
 
Seoul
 
3. 	 Likely Income Level of Occupantss 
65th percentile and above. 
Total Cost - W 5,364 million. 
Amount of Loan - US$ 10 million, W 4,000 million. 1/ 
Likely Population Accomodated -- 7,450. 2/ 
Land Required - 32,365 pyonqs. 
4. 	 Terms: 
Financing -- 74.57 percent.
Interect rate - 8.0 percent plus 2.14'*percent maintenance­
of-value fee. 
Increasing variable payments with 24-year repayment peOriod.
L'o npayment - W 915,600. i '11'r
 
Limited monthly payment -- W 14,856.
 
5. 	 Units: 
Number - 1,490
 
Type - 3 bedroom in five-story building.-

Size -- 22-pyong apartments.
 
Average Costs - W 3,600,000.
 
6. 	Construction:
 
Type -- Prefabricated and on-site.
 
Method of heating - Central.
 
7. 	Method of Marketing and Sales 
Model unit on site. 
Choice by lottery with 6,300 applicants for 1#490 units. 
8. 	Present Status:
 
Complete.
 
9. 	 Cosmentaryt
An upper-middle-income project implemented with great 
success.
 
8,300 applicants for 1,490 apartments.
 
NOTES: 1/ At US$ 1.00 V 400.
W 
T/ At 5 persons per unit
 
SOURCZ: ProJect Paper and Implementation Agreement. 
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Project HO 002: 
Six 	Cities' Apartments
 
1. 	 Application - March 1974 
Zmplmentation Agreement - April 1974 
2. 	 Locations: 
Seoul. Pusan, Taegu, Taejou, Kvangju, Inchou. 
Level of Occupantss
 
25th percentile
 
3. 	 Likely unccm 
Total Cost -- W 11,380 million.
 
Amunt of Loan - US$ 20 millionr*w 8400 million,.
 
Ikely Population Accommodated -- 18,500 ./*
 
Land Required - n.a.
 
4. 	 Terms: 
Financiny - 70 percent. 
Interest rate -- 8.75 percent. 
Payments - Level payments with 10-year grace period and 
a 25-year total repayment period. ,.W 1,010,000.Downpaymenft - 13-pyong, W 653#0001 15-pyong, 

Monthly payment - 13-pyongg W 11,2801 15-pyong. W 17,440.
 
5. 	 Unit: 
Number - 1,000 2 bedroom, 2,700 3 bedroom. 
Types - 13-pyonqP 15-pyong. 
Size - 5-story aparments. 
Average Cost - 13-pyong, W 2,200,0001 15-pyongo, W3,400,000. 
6. 	 Constructions 
Type - On-site. 
Method of heating - Central.
 
7. 	Method of Marketing and Sales 
Model unit on-site.
 
Lottery
 
G. 	Present Status: 
Complete.
 
9. 	 Comentary, 
Smaller units at lower-.oat vith',very attractive , 
financing. 
1/ At US$ 1.00 - W 400.OTS: / 5t persons per unit.,
 
SOMR€o Project Paper and Implemetation greement. 
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-
Project HG 003
 
Apartments 
1. 	 Application -- March 1975.
 
ZAIPlementation Aqreement - July 1975.
 
•'2. 	 Locations 
SeouL, Pusan, Taequ, Ulsan, Chanqwan, Suwan, Sunqnam,. -. 
3. 	 Likely Income Level of Occupants: , , ­
25th to 65th percentile. 
Total Cost - W 24,000 million., 
Amount of Loan - US$ 25 million = W 12,000 million 1/ 
Likely Population Accozusodated -- 4 6,000V!/, " -
Land 	Required - N.A. 
4. 	 Terms: 
Financinq - 50 percent financed in Seoul. 50 percent 
financed in other cities with supplementary financing 
from Korean sources of 20 percent to be repaid in five 
years at 9.5 percent interest. 
naterest rate - 9.5 percent.
Payments - 10-year qrace period and a 26-year total. 
repayment period.
Donpayment - .3-pyon., W 1,244,000, lS-pyong, W 1,433,200. 
Monthly payment -- 13-pyang, W 9,833; 15-pyong, W 20,633. 
Supplementary loan - 13-pyon, W 11,346y 15-pyonq,.W 23,787. 
5. 	Units:
 
Number -- 6,200 2 bedrooms 3,000 3 bedroom.
 
Types - 2 bedroom in five-story apartments, 3 bedroom
 
in f ve-s ory apartments. 
Size - 13-pyong, 15-pyong. 
Average Cost - 13-pyonq, W 2,468,000; 15-pyong,, 2,866,400. 
6. 	Construction:
 
Type -- N.A.
 
Method of heating -- Ondol.
 
7. 	 Method of Marketing and Sale: 
N.A.
 
,8. 	Present Statues
 
Complete.
 
9. 	Couentarys
The same size units as HG 002 but the costs of the 15-pyong 
averaae units have been reduced. On the other hand, the 
terms of financing vere made less favorabie to the 
buyer, by providing less long-term tinar..a. 
NOTES: 	 1/ At USS 1.00 a 1'480."
 
27 At 5 persons per -unit.
 
SOURCE: 	Project Paperiand ImplementatIion Agreement.
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Project '10 004 
Housing Improvement in Seoul City
 
(Upgrading Proj eot)
 
1. 	Application - March 1975.
 
Green Book - may 1975.
 
July 1, 1976.
Implementation Agreement --

-- September 1976.Construction Started 
2. 	Location:
 
Seoul
 
3. 	Likely Zncome Level of Occupants
 
15th to 60th percentile.
 5 million on contract.
US$ 10 militon, USS
Amount of Loan -

Likely Population Accommodated - 20,000 (preliminary 
estimate pending completion of further project plans). 
contained the following components:'
4. 	 The project 
Access roads, utilities,
-Znfrastructure Improvements 

severs, storm drainaqa and slope protection, green areas, 
comaunity facilities, demolition of existing dwellings 
(to 	make way for infrastructure). 
Land Sales - Up to 90 percent financing. 20 to 30 percent 
cash payment (20 percent for lots largerdiscount for 
than 30 pyong and 30 percent for up to 30 pyong). 
Loans 	-- These loans armeavailable toHome Improvement 
occupants of dwellings to.be demolished tO make way 
for infrastructure or because dwillings are condemned 
as unsafe for habitation. The loans will be used to 
and 	not to
finance dwellings not exceeding 15 pyongs con­
exceed W 1,000,000 (exclusive of land Cost) and if 
struction is inside of improvement airea: when outside 
not to exceed W 1,500,000. A 25-year repayment period. 
5. 	Interest Rate: 
U.S. investors - 8.5 percent.
 
AID fee -- .5 percent.
 
Total -- 9.0 percent.
 
6. 	 Present Status: Some infrastr ctrs'*iniialled.Under 	construction. 

Expected completion of infrastructure improvementsin 
1977.
 
7. 	Comaentary
 
Excellent oroiectd iministrative aitd"fn Lfacial plan. A
 
basis 	 for subsequeni projects. , 
Project Paper, Implementation Agreement, and
SOURCEs 

Seoul City Redevelopment PLan. .­
-130­
Project LEG 005 
apartoent'.s 
1. 	Application - uly 1975. ,

Zmplementation Agreement -- July 1976. 
2. 	 Location: 
Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Znchouo Pohanq, Hasan. 
3. 	 Likely Zncome Level of Occupants: 
10th to 45th percentile.
Total Cost - W 14,400 million. 
Amunt of Loan - US$ 15 million - V 7,200'million 1/ 
Likely Population Accommodated -- 23,550 2 
Land Required - N.A. 
4. 	 Terms: 
Financinq - 50 percent financed in Seoul. 70 percent 
financed in other cities. 
Znterest rate - 9.45 percent.
Payments - Level payments with 10-year grace period and 
a 25-year total repayment period.
Downpayment -- 7.5-pyong, W 961,5001 LO-pyong, w 1,157,000 
to W 1.,26,0001 13-pyong, V 1,374,000 to W 1,471,000. 
Monthly payment - 7.5-pyonq, Wi7,570; 10-pyona, V 9p043 
to V 14,0691 13-pyong, W 10,738 to W 16,099. 
5. 	Units: 
Humber - 500 1 bedroom 1,440 2 bedroom; 2,770 3 bedroom. 
Type - 1 bedroom in five-story apartments, 2 bedroom in 
five-storI apartments, 3 bedroom in five-story apartments. 
Size - 7.5-pyongsy L0-pyonqs, 13-pyongs. 
Average Cost -- 7.5-pyong, V 1,963,000t 10-pyong,
V 2,314,000 to T?2,372,OOO; 13-pyonq, V 2,748,000 to
 
t 2,943,000.
 
S. 	Construction: 
Type -- N.A. 
Method of heating -- Ondol and Central. 
7. 	Method of Marketing and Sale:
 
N.A.
 
8. 	Present Status: 
Complete and units occupied except some 7.5-pyOng units. 
9. 	 Comentarys
Contains the smallest units built to date and is ILkely 
to reach income groups below the 20th percentile. 
NOTES: 1/ At US$ 1.00 n W,480. 
'/At 5 persons per unit. 
SOURCE:- Project-Paper and Implementation Agreeeni.
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Appendix III
 
STATISTICAL DATA
 
TABLE 25 
Housing Situatiou by Site 
Size Nationwide Large Cities Other Cities Rural Areas' 
(pyongs) Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
7 or less 769,744 17.7 139,493 17.6 120,997 19.9 509,254 17.2 
8,to 9 654,736 15.0 809,542 11.3 77,515 12.8 487,679 16.5 
iOto 14 1;405,673 -­32.2 231,731 29.3 195,409 32.2 - 978,533 26.6 
-15 to"24 1,195,578 27.4 239,902 ­ 30.4- 168,353 29.7 787g323 26.6 e 
25 to 39 269,088.. 6.2 63,350 - 8.0 34,842 -5.7 170,896- 5.8 
-40to 59. 47,704_ 1.1 17,658 2.3 7,482 1.2 22,564 0.7 
60 or more: 17,288 0.4 81654 1.1 2,786 0.5 5,847 -0.2, 
Totial -4,369a811 100.0 790,331 -100.0 607,384 100.0 2,962,096 100.0 
SOURCE3 -EPB, .TotalPopulation and Houslig-Census Report, 1970. 
TABLE 26
 
housing Situation by Types
 
Rural Areas
Nationwide Large Cities Other Cities 

Percent
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number 
Type 

Sile Detached -4,154,910 95.3 693,820 87.7 560,330 -92.3 2,900,760 96.0 
Public Housing ­ 179,433 4.1 84,601 10.7 39,819 6.5 55,013 1.9 
Chained Housing' 146,235 3.4 55,741 A7.137460 6.1 - 53,034 ,o 1.8 
Apartment - 33,198 0.7 28,860- 3.6 . 2,359 0.4 , 1,979 0.1 
others - 548.05 1,1 -1.5 7,235- 1--2 6,323- 0,­
-Total- 4,349,811 100.0 790,331 100.0 607,384 100.0 2,962,096 '< 100.0 
SOURCE: EPB, Total Population and Housing'Census Report, -1970.
 
" TABLE 2'7 
Housing Situation by Area,and Occupancy 
(in thousands) 
Whole Other Urban 
Classification Country Big cities 
 Areas Rural Areas
 
of Houses Number Percent Number Percent- Number Percent Number Percent­
Self-owned 3,996,198 
 91.7 682,731 86.4 515,349 84.8 2,798,118 94.5
 
Rent 240,708 5.5 91,760 11.6 75,947 12.5 73,001 2.5
 
Free 120,923 2.8 14,820 1.9 15,707 2.6 90,396 3.0
 
Unknown, 2,133 0.1 i,009 0.1 
 536 0.1 588 0.0
 
Total 4,359,962 
 100.0 790,320 100.0 607,539 100.0 2,962,103 100.0
 
SOURCE:, EPB, Total-Population and Housing Census-Report, 1970.
 
-TABLE 28
 
.
HouAig Situation by Number ai "Rooms 
Number of 	Rooms Number of Houses Percent 
1 322,004 7.4 
2 1,531,517 35.1 
3 1,365,522 31.3 
4 683,506 15.7' 
5 257,815 5.9 
' 

-'2-5
-w6°	 107,246 0.9  
. 7 40,821 0.9' 
8 23,145 0.5 
9 10,482 2 
10 	 17,712 --0.4--

Total - 4,359,811 100.0 
SOURCE: 	 EPB, Total Population and Housing
 
Census Report, 1970.
 
TABLE 29
 
Population Growth Forecasts in the May 1975
 
Korea Housing Policy
 
Households Urban Households Population Urban Population I
 
Percent Percent *Percent Percent Percent
 
Year Number Increase - Number Increase Number Increase Number:,Increase of T0tal
 
1973 5,934 2,958 32,905 15,136 46. o 
1974 6,071. 2.31 3,134 5.95 33,399 -1.5 15,951 5.38 47.76 ­
-1975 6,220 2.45 3,318 5.87 33,900'> 1.5 16,744 4.97 49.39 
1976- 6,372 2.44 3,505 5.64 34,408 1.5 17,548 - 4.80 51.00 
1977 6,528 2.45 3,694 5.39 34,924 "-1.5 18,347 4.55 52.53 
1978 6,682 2.36 3,889 5.28 35,413 1.4 19,157 - 4.41 54.10 
_1979- 6,833 2.26 4,085 5.04 35,873 1.3 19,960 4.19 55.64 
1980 6,986 2.24 4,309 5.48 36,329 1.27 20,910- 4.76 57.56 
;198 -7,148 2.32 4,505 4.55 36,811 1.33 21,669 3.63 58.87 
SOURCE:- Korea Industrial Development Research Institute, Study on Housing Policy Formulation,
 
KiDfDe cember 1974.---
-
TABLE 31 
TABLE 30 
Comparison of Population Forecasts-
Housing situation by"Number of Persons 	 (Population x 000) 
Fourth Housing
No.,of Persons No; of Houses- Percent 	 Housing Policy
Construction Construction

-__and 

to 3 621,889 " 14 3 	 Year Plan (1975) Plan (1976) 
4 	 450,932 10.3
 
13.9 	 1972 32,416

- 607,004 
6 688,172 15.8 1973 32,905 
7 -U 607,760 13.9 1974 33,399 
. 437,065 10.0 1975 33,900 35,281 
9 287,254 6.6 1976 34,408 35,875 
10 192,462 4.4 
-1 .... 109,871 2.5 J1977 34,924 36,450 
12 --- 81,463 1.9 1978 35,413._ 37,029 
13'% 59,777 -1.4- 1979 35,873. 37,618 
14 45,971\ < 1.1 1930 .36,329 - 38,219 
15 to19- . . 111,543 .2.6 1981 36,B11 - 38,834 
201to 24 35,443 0.8 
25 23,206 0.5 1977­
1981 2,403 	 2,959
 
Total 4.359,811 .,100.0 
1972- 4,964 
1981 - n.a. 
SOURCE: 	 EPB, Total Population and Housing 
Census Repcrt, 1970. SOURCE: 	 PADCO Analysis. 
TABLE 32
 
Comparison of Forecasts of Number of Households 
- (Number of Householdi x 000) 
Housing Policy 

and Construction 

Plan (1975) 

Year Total Urban 

1972 5,774 2,705
 
1973 5,934 2,958
 
1974- 6'071 3,134
 
1975 6,220 3,318 

1976 6,372 3,505 

1977, 6,528 3,694 

1978 6,682 3,889 

1979' 6.883 4,085 

1980 6,986 4,309 

1981 7,148 4,505 

1977- 776 1.000 

1981
 
1972­
1981 1,498- 1,910 

0WE-Sou •PADCO Analsis. 
Fourth
 
Housing
 
Construction
 
Plan (1976)
 
6,474
 
6,644
 
6,813
 
6,987
 
7,165
 
7,350
 
7,541
 
897
 
- n.a. 
TABLE 33 
May 1975 Housing Plan
 
-- Projection of Iousing Investment by Income Group 
(in billion won, constant 1974 prices) 
Total Budget Qntract 
Ikusing Constrr.- Invest- Ibtal ApprcprIa- kusing Hmk~ing Savings Fomign Misml- Private Farks 
Gwtp D nd(/y tion cost2_ at tion lottery ond Fund Capital anxm 
Lowest easerved Land 
, -
Sales 94 2,200 154 140 80 22 38 - - - 14 1Price Incl i 
20 - -
Rental 	 1,500 36 36 t6 - - -
Low "100 1,600 160 112 40 - 14 - 58 - 48 70%public 
Lower Middle 166 1,700 281 168 - 103- - 18- 47 113 60% public 
Upper Middle 200 1,800 360 180 - - - 134 -- ' 46 190 SO& public 
High 821 2,000 1,640 - - ... -. 1,640 1001 private 
Highest 444 2 1 5O - -1- - 1,110 1001 Ori~ait 
Total- 1,825 (2.027) -3,741 636- 136 '22 155' 134 -'96 93 3,105 (171 public) 
Remodeled Areas 178 1,600 282 152 - - 12. 38 30 -72- 130 541 public 
Rural'Areas 84 700 58 41- 17 ' - 24 17 	 701 public 
4,081 829 153 22 191 172 126 165 3,252

,Total 2.087 (1.955)
 
(100) 	 (20) - - (80) 
: flo0.0) (18.5) (2.7)- (230) (20.7) (15.2) (19.9) 
NOTESa 1/ Thousand units. 2/ Thousand won.
 
SOURCE, Ministry of Construction, Korea National Housing Policy and Long-Term Construction Plan.
 
TABLE 34
 
Fourth Housing Construction Plan
 
Housing Investment by Year
 
(in billions of won, 1975 prices-

Year 

1966-

1967 

1983 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

1973 

1974 

1975 

19-16 

1977 

1978 

1979 

1980 

1981 

Total 

21.18 

28.10 

48.67 

55.35 

87.93 

101.14 

104.66 

157.92 

299.27 

402.00 

380.00 

433.00 

475.00 

516.00 

580.00 

637.00 

Percent
 
of GNP
 
2.1
 
2.2
 
3.0
 
2.7
 
3.4
 
3.2
 
2.7
 
3.2
 
4.4
 
4.4
 
3.6
 
3.8
 
3.8
 
3.8
 
3.9
 
3.9
 
SOURCE:- EPB, Fourth -
Housing Construc­
tion Plan-- ­
TABLE 35 
Public Housing Costs
 
and Housing Loan Ceilings
 
Loan as
Py Area, Standard Construction Construction 
Type and Size Space Cost per Pyong Cost per House Loan Percnt 'ofCost 
Apartments
 
2,730 1,200 44
for Lease 13 210 

Apartents
 
for Sale 
in Lots:
 
12-15 pyong 12 180 2,160 , 500 69 
16-20 pyong 16 180 2,880 1,800 63 
21-25 pyong 21 180, 3,780 2,000 -,,53 
Duplex
 
Houses: 
12-20 pyong 12 120 1i,440 900 .- 63 
21-25 pyong 21 120 2,520 1,200 , 48 
independent
 
Houses in
 
Medium and 0 lf, so
 
Small Cities 18 130 2,340 1,200 50
 
Rural Houses:
 
Up-level 18 100 1,800 900 50
 
600 -	 57
Farm Houses 15 70 1,050 

Houses for .
 
Resettlement of
 
the Former Resi­
dents of Indus­
trial Estates:
 
12-15 pyong 12 120 1,440 I,000 69
 
16-20 pyonq 16 120 1,920 1,100 57
 
21 620 2,520 ,1300 52
21-25 pyong 

Apartents for
 
Former Residents
 
of Removed Houses
 
160 	 1,000
in Cities 9 	 1,620 62
 
SOURCE: 	Ministry of Construction. 1976 National Housing Construction
 
Plan and Guiding Principles for Fund Management. (Typed English
 
Translation).
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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
 
A. APARTMENT AREAS
 
Pyongs 
" 

7.5 

10.0 

13.0 

15i., 

22.0 
.. 

• Square Feet 
' 10 ' 35.S 
265.0
 
355.0
 
460.0
 
532.0
 
781.0
 
CURRENCY
 
,1971 to 1974 
 W 400- US$11.00
 
1975 to date w 480 US$ 1.00
 
C. 
1970 
Korea 31.4 million 
Seoul 5.5 million 
Pusan 1.9 million 
Urban 12.9'million 
POPULATION 
1975 ' 
Percentage
6f-Growth 
34.7 million 
6.8 million 
2.5 millioni 
16.7 million 
10.5 
24.5' 
30.0 
29.7 
-1437
 
D. iLIST OF KEY KOREAi GOVERNMNT 
AGENCIES IN THE HOUSING SECTOR
 
1. The Economic Planning Board (EPB)
 
The EPB is placed directly under the Prime Minister and 
is responsible for establishing overall plans for development 
of the national economy, formulation and execution of the bud­
get, overall investment and technological development, and * 
international economic cooperation.
 
2. Ministry of Construction (MOC)
 
The MOC is responsible for planning and development of
 
national territory, all public works, urban development and
 
housing. The Koreaa National Fousing Corporation reports to
 
MOC.
 
3. Miziistry of Finance (MOF)
 
The MOT' has charge of currency, finance and taxation,
 
foreign exchange and control of public property. The Korean
 
Housing Bank reports to MOF. 
4. Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) 
MOHA exercises supervision over all local governments 
except Seoul City which enjoys Ministerial status.
 
5. Korean National Housing Corporation '(KNIC) 
The KNHC was established in 1962. Its funct2ons are:
 
to construct, improve, sell and lease housing; to construct
 
and manage housing under contract; to construct and manage
 
commnunity facilities for large housing projects; to improve
 
housing construction materials; and to develop and distribute
 
housing sites.
 
6. Korean Housina Bank (KHB)
 
The KXH was established in 1967. Its functions are: to
 
manage and loan funds for purchase and construction of new
 
housing and the development of housing sites; to manage and
 
loan fund to local governments and small- and medium-scale
 
businesses to produce or deal in standard planned, low-cost
 
housing materials; to accept deposits and housing installment
 
deposits; to issue housing bonds; and to conduct a housing
 
lottery.
 
7. Seoul City Government
 
Seoul City's mayor enjoys Cabinet status and the city has­
mre independence,than other Korean cities.
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